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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
October 30, 1981 Conference 





Cert to the Texas Court of ------
Criminal Appeals (Clinton, 
Roberts and Odom) 
State/Criminal Timely 
SUMMARY: Whether the court below erred in holding that 
despite a police officer's professional judgment that a balloon 
contained illegal drugs, he may not ely on the "plain view" 
doctrine to seize the balloon. ~~ ~ s~ 
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FACTS: During the course of a routine, fixed-location 
driver's license check, an officer saw the Respondent pull from 
his pocket and drop to his seat an opaque, tied-off balloon. As 
the Respondent opened the glove compartment, the officer observed 
numerous plastic vials, additional loose balloons, and loose 
white powder (which turned out to be milk sugar}. The officer 
then ordered the Respondent out of the car and seized the balloon 
on the car seat. Based on his conclusion from a cursory 
inspection that the balloon contained a powdery substance, and 
based on his experiences as an officer, he arrested the 
Respondent for drug law violations. 
Subsequent chemical analysis showed that the balloon 
~ ~ contained heroin. The trial court denied the Respondent's motion 
to suppress the evidence, and he entered a plea of nolo 
contendere. 
HOLDING: The Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the 
conviction, holding that under Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
u.s. 443 (1971), the seizure was unlawful. According to the 
court below, one of the three elements of the plain view doctrine 
requires that "it must be immediately apparent to the police that 
they have evidence before them." Because the officer could not 
testify what, if anything, was in the opaque balloon, he had not 
sufficient grounds to believe that he was seizing contraband. 
.. 
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Although the panel opinion was unanimous, three judges 
dissented from the denial of leave to file a motion for 
rehearing. Principally, they argued that an officer relying on 
years of practical experience had probable cause to believe that 
the balloon contained illegal drugs. In support of their 
position, the dissenting judges pointed to cases from other state 
and federal jurisdictions holding that tied-off balloons (and 
other drug related objects) in plain view can be lawfully seized. 
CONTENTIONS: 
1. The Petitioner first argues that the decision below 
conflicts with Coolidge v. United States, 403 u.s. 443 (1971), 
and United States v. Cortez, 101 s. Ct. 690 (1981). In Coolidge, 
a plurality of this Court wrote that an item could be seized 
without a warrant under the plain view doctrine "only where it is 
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before 
them." 403 U.S. at 466. Since, an experienced police officer 
would immediately realize that the Respondent's balloon contained 
illegal drugs, the seizure was lawful. In Cortez, this Court 
made clear that an officer's experience is a legitimate factor in 
deciding whether he has probable cause to act. Other cases, 
while not involving the plain view doctrine, have made clear that 
the "contents [of some containers] can be inferred from their 
outward appearance." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 u.s. 753, 764 n.l3 
(1979). See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1981). 
The Petitioner emphasizes that an officer need not be certain of 
the balloon's contents before he may act. See Payton v. New 
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York, 445 u.s. 573, 587 (1980) (holding that the seizure of 
private property in plain view is presumptively reasonable, 
"assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property 
with criminal activity"). 
2. The Petitioner also urges this Court to grant its 
petition because the decision below conflicts with the decisions 
of other state courts. 
3. The Respondent opposes granting the petition, insisting 
that the decision below was based on state law, and not on the 
Fourth Amendment. 
DISCUSSION: A review of the petition below and the cases 
cited indicates that the decision was based on the Fourth 
Amendment, and not on Texas law. Nowhere in the opinion below, 
or in the cases cited, does the Texas court refer to Texas 
statutes or constitutional provisions. 
To the extent that it believed that its holding was 
compelled by decisions of this Court, the Texas court erred. 
While the decision below does not conflict squarely with any 
holdings of this Court, it certainly ignores some of this Court's 
recent opinions. And as the Petitioner argues, other courts do 
not hesitate to hold that tied-off balloons and similar objects 
in plain view may be seized if in the officer's experience the 
objects are evidence of criminal activity. 
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Nevertheless, I am not sure this case is certworthy. The 
effect of the decision below is limited to Texas, and the court 
may have rul~ differently if the officer had slightly more 
information before seizing the balloon. 
I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
10/14/81 Dwyer Opinion in petition 
• f 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
1) 
Re: Cases held for United States v. Ross, 
No. 80-2209 
Texas v. Brown, No.~i:) 
In this case the State of Texas seeks review of a 
decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. That court 
ruled that the trial court erred in denying respondent's 
motion to suppress evidence. 
Respondent's automobile was stopped as part of a 
"routine and nonrandom license check." When asked to 
produce his driver's license, respondent put his hand into 
the right front pocket of his trousers. After fumbling 
inside the pocket, respondent withdrew a dollar bill that 
was partialiy folded and "a small gr e en balloon stuck 
between his fing e rs." Still seeking his driver's license, 
respondent looked into the glove compartment of his car. As 
he did so the investigating officer saw some empty plastic 
vials, a white powdery substance that was later determined 
not to be a controlled substance, and a bag of party 
balloons. At some point, r e spo~dent dropped the green 
balloon onto the s e at of the car. · The officer ordered 
respondent to get out of the car; he then r e ached into the 
car and seized the green balloon. The balloon contained 
heroin. No warrant had been obtained. 
The trial court denied a motion to suppress. On 
appeal, the State argued that the warrantless search was 
justified under the "plain view" doctrine. A three-judge 
panel of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed. It 
stated that it did not question either the validity of the 
officer's initial stop of respondent's vehicle or "the 
propriety of the arrest since [respondent] failed to produce 
N~ ~ ~ss c.o-U- . -
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a driver's license." The court rejected the State's "plain -
view" argument, howev~r, on the ground that the allegedly 
incriminating contents of the balloon--unlike the balloon 
itself--were not in plain view. The court analogized the 
seizure of the balloon to a seizure of a translucent vial or 
photographic negative. 
The State petitioned for rehearing en bane. The court 
denied the motion, with three judges dissenting. The 
dissenting judges believed that, since the balloon itself 
was in plain view, a warrantless seizure was justified if 
the officer had probable cause to believe that it was 
connected with criminal activity. They found such probable 
cause pr e sent in this case; "the permissible d eduction that 
[a tied-off balloon] is commonly linked to heroin forms a 
legitimate basis to the trained law enforc ement officer for 
suspicion." 
Although this case involves the search of a 
"container," it is not affected by our decision in Ross. It 
was unnecessary in Ross to adopt an "unworthy container" 
exception to the warrant requirement. There is no 
suggestion in this case that the officer had probable cause 
to search respondent's vehicle; our analysis in Ross is thus 
inapplicable. Nor does the State contend that the search 
was justified as incident to respondent's arrest. This case 
does present, however, the question of just how 
"incriminating" an object must be to justify a warrantless 
search under the plain view doctrine. Although that is not 
an insubstantial question, I am inclin to defer to the 
state court's appraisal of the incr· 1 atrn character of 
balloons in Texas. I will aeny. 
· . 
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STATEMENT AD SENT NOT VOTING 
G D N POST DIS/1 AFF REV AFF G D 
Michael F. Sturley 
Question Presented 
Does the Fourth Amendment permit the warrantless seizure 
of a tied-off balloon that a police officer lawfully observes in 
plain view, when the officer was aware of previous cases in which 
heroin was carried in such balloons? 
bench memo: Tex - , v. Brown page 2. 
I. Background 
A. Facts 
The essential facts appear to be undisputed. On the 
evening of June 18, 1979, the Fort Worth police set up a routine, 
nonrandom license checkpoint. At about 11:00 p.m., Officer Ma-
L ------------------ples stopped resp' s automobile and asked resp to produce his 
driver's license. Resp put his hand in his pocket, and kept it 
there long enough to worry the officer. The officer therefore 
shined his flashlight into the car at resp's hand. Resp partial-
ly removed his hand from his pocket, allowing Officer Maples to 
.......... -
see a tied-off balloon between resp's middle fingers. Resp -- ._,u • • -- ,.... ............................. -, -
dropped the balloon to the car seat and rummaged in the glove 
compartment, where Officer Maples was able to see some small 
plastic vials, some white powder, and a bag of balloons. After 
about a minute resp told Officer Maples that he was unable to 
find his license, so the officer requested resp to get out of the 
car. After resp did so, Officer Maples saw the tied-off balloon 
on the car seat and seized it. The balloon was later found to 
contain heroin. 
B. Decisions Below 
Resp was charged with possession of heroin. He moved to 
suppress the evidence seized from the car, particularly the tied-
off balloon. The TC, after a hearing, denied the motion. Pre-
serving his right to appeal the suppression decision, resp plead-
ed nolo contendere to the charge and was sentenced to four years 
imprisonment. 
bench memo: Tex - , v. Brown page 3. 
On appeal the Tex. Ct. Crim. App. reversed, holding that 
it was not "immediately apparent" to Officer Maples that the bal-
loon contained contraband, so the "flain view" exception to the -
warrant requirement did not apply. It treated the balloon as 
being similar to a plastic bag, a photographic negative, or a 
translucent vial--the objects in three previous cases in which 
the Texas courts had held the plain view exception inapplicable. 
II. Discussion 
Much of the argument in this case has been at cross-
purposes. Resp devotes most of his brief to the argument that 
the decision be low was based on state law. Since this issue 
should have been resolved at the cert petn stage, the State did 
not even address it in its principal brief. See part II.A, in-
fra. The State and the SG, on the other hand, devote much of 
their attention to the proper legal standard under the Fourth 
Amendment--an issue on which resp concedes. See part II.B, in-
fra. In the end, the key question is whether the arresting offi- ~ 
cer had probable cause to believe that the balloon contained nar- ~ 
cotics. See part II.C, infra. 
~ ~1-c..· J.c -
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A. The Basis of the Lower Court's Dec1s1on ~ •• ~v~ 
I • • 1 • ~~~,.j. 
ReSp s pr1nc1pa argument 1s that the~~.w~s~ 
based on state law, and thus is not reviewable here. This con-
tention was considered at the cert petn stage ~df~- 1 
jected. The Tex. Ct. Crim. App. applied the Fourth Amendment, 
and gave no indication of relying on state law. 
bench memo: Tex ~ v. Brown page 4. 
The only mention of any constitutional provision in the 
opinion below is in the summary of resp's contentions: 
In [resp' s] sole ground of error he complains that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because the evidence was seized in contravention of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and 
the Texas Constitution, Article I, §9. 
Petn A-1. In its resolution of the plain view issue, the court 
relied on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), for the 
statement of the general rule. It then relied on four state 
cases to clarify the rule and explain its application: Howard v. 
State, 599 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); DeLao v. State, 550 
S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Duncan v. State, 549 S.W.2d 
730 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973) .1 
On the basis of a simple "case count" it might appear 
that the decision below is based primarily on state law, but the 
treatment of the plain view issue in the four state cases dis-
proves the theory. Nicholas, the earliest of the four, relied 
only on Coolidge, the federal case, for its concusion that photo-
graphic negatives in plain view could not be seized under the 
plain view exception. 2 DeLao and Duncan, which were decided just 
1The court also cited Taylor v. State, 599 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1967). It cannot be said to have relied on Taylor for 
the proposition at issue here, however, since Taylor upheld a 
plain view seizure. In any event, Taylor itself relied primarily 
on federal law. 
2Nicholas also cited four decisions of the Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 
that upheld plain view seizures. None of these cases suggests 
any limitation on the plain view exception, let alone a limita-
tion unique to state law. 
bench memo: Tex - ~ v. Brown page 5. -
two weeks apart, each relied on Coolidge, the federal case, and 
Nicholas, the state case based on Coolidge. 3 Finally, Howard 
relied principally on Coolidge and the other three state cases. 4 
The relationships among these cases are rather like the 
relationships among the royal families of Europe. Just as the 
royal blood line always leads back to Queen Victoria, the legal 
rationale underlying the Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 's suppression of 
evidence seized under the plain view doctrine always leads back 
to Coolidge. There is no suggestion in any of these cases that 
the court is also relying on state law. This Court is justified 
in concluding that only the Fourth Amendment was involved. 
B. The Proper Legal Standard 
By now there should be 1 it tle doubt that the Fourth 
Amendment permits the police to seize property in plain view if, ~ 
among other things, "there is probable cause to associate the 
property with criminal activity." Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 
573, 587 (1980) (dicta). Justice Stewart's opinion in Colorado 
v. Bannister, 449 u.s. 1 (1980) (per curiam), is particularly 
3rn discussing the plain view issue, DeLao also cited Jackson 
v. State, 489 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), which upheld the 
seizure of marijuna in plain view. 
4Howard also relied on Kolb v. State, 532 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1976), in which the court found that marijuana seized by the 
police had not been in plain view as a factual matter. Kolb, in 
turn, relied on five state cases for the existence of the plain 
view exception, but it cited no authority for the invalidity of 
the seizure. There is certainly no indication in Kolb that state 
law places a more severe restriction on the plain view doctrine 
than that found in Coolidge. 
- - _ ...... - - .. . -~ - ........ & page t:>. 
relevant here. In Bannister, a police officer stopped an automo-
bile to issue a traffic citation and saw some chrome lug nuts and 
two lug wrenches in plain view. Since these i terns rna tched the 
description of property just stolen in the area, and since the 
occupants of the car matched the description of the suspects in 
the robbery, he had probable cause to arrest the occupants and 
seize the stolen property. 
Resp concedes that probable cause is the appropriate 
stand~d jo_S _plain view seizures under the Fourth Amendment. 
~~_.
Brief 9, 13, 23. The Tex. Ct. Crim. App., however, applied a 
much higher standard. It took Coolidge's phrase "immediately 
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them," 403 
/ 
U.S., at 466, out of context and required the State to prove that 
the arresting officer "kn[e]w" that there was incriminating evi-
dence in the balloon when he seized it. At the very least, the 
Court should correct this error. 
C. The Application of the Probable Cause Standard 
The TC denied the suppression motion, but it is not 
clear that it did so on the proper grounds. It would have been 
better if the TC explicitly had found that Officer Maples had 
probable cause to believe that narcotics were in the tied-off 
balloon, but here I think the Court can reach that conclusion 
alone. Officer Maples testified that he once had made an arrest 
in a case where narcotics were carried in balloons such as the 
one at issue here. He had also heard of similar cases from other 
~··-- "" •••---•-.,.,- • """ "-~~ g v • ~.&..V¥'111 
officers. 5 Even the Tex. Ct. Crim. App. has recognized that a 
balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics. 
See DeLao v. State, supra. 
What is even more important, there does not seem to be 
i\.. " any innocent i tern that is commonly carried in an uninflated, 
tied-off balloon. (Air, water, and helium are all innocent, but 
they give the balloon a different appearance than narcotics.) 
This case is thus very different from those on which the Tex. Ct. 
Crim. App. relied. Photographic negatives commonly contain inno-
cent pictures, not evidence of crime. Cf. Nicholas, supra. Al-
though "bagg ies" are common containers for narcotics, they are 
used even more frequently for innocent food. Cf. Duncan, supra. 
Finally, pill containers are used not only for illegal drugs but 
legitimate prescriptions. Cf. Howard, supra. 
Here Officer Maples plainly viewed an uninflated, tied-
off balloon with something inside. Narcotics are commonly car-
ried in this way, but innocent items rarely are. Under the cir-
cumstances, he had probable cause to believe that there were nar-
cotics in the balloon. 
Resp's arguments to the contrary are nothing more than 
an attempt to impose a standard higher than probable cause. He 
points out that no one could tell what was in the balloon without 
subjecting the contents to chemical analyis. Brief 7. While 
this is true, the argument proves too much. Even if the heroin 
5This is 
Brief 6. 
resp's interpretation of the Maples testimony. 
The testimony itself is not a model of clarity. 
See 
. ~~~~--------- - - ----- - .. - ---·-- ¥ • _.._ ....., ... ... .. pa':::jt: o • 
itself had been in plain view, the officer would not know what it 
was without chemical analysis. The point, of course, is that the 
officer does not have to know that he is seizing an illegal drug. 
This is the mistake that the Tex. Ct. Crim. App. made. It is 
enough if he has probable cause to believe that what he is seiz-
ing is an illegal drug. Officer Maples had that probable cause 
here. 
III. Conclusion 
Although the Tex. Ct. Crim. App. would be free on remand 
to reaffirm its earlier decision on state law grounds, the deci-
sion below was based on the Fifth Amendment. The proper Fifth 
Amendment standard here is admittedly the probable cause stan-
dard. Under the circumstances of this case, the arresting offi-
cer had the probable cause necessary to justify the seizure at 
issue. The decision below should be reversed . 
.. 
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~~ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
? 
No. 81-419 
TEXAS, PETITIONER v. CLIFFORD JAMES BROWN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS OF TEXAS 
[February -, 1983] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent Clifford James Brown was convicted in the 
District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, for possession of 
heroin in violation of state law. The Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that evidence intro-
duced at his trial should have been suppressed because it was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 1 That court rejected the state's con-
1 Brown argues that the decision below rested on an independent and ad-
equate state ground, and therefore that this Court lacks jurisdiction. Fox 
Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). The position is untena-
ble. The opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rests squarely on 
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution in Coolidge v. N ew Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), and on 
Texas cases interpreting that decision, e. g., Howard v. State, 599 S.W. 2d 
597 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); DeLao v. State, 550 S.W. 2d 289 (Tex.Cr.App. 
1977); Duncan v. State , 549 S.W. 2d 730 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); and Nicholas 
v. State, 502 S. W. 2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973). The only mention of the 
Texas Constitution occurs in a summary of Brown's contentions at the out-
set of the lower court's opinion. In a field like thP- Fourth Amendment, 
~e the federal courts have been so active in imposing standards on state 
and local activities, a more affirmative indication in the opinion of the state 
court of reliance on state law is necessary before we will reject the likely 
explanation that "the [state] court felt compelled by what it understood to 
be federal constitutional considerations" to reach the result it did. 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 568 (1977). 











2 TEXAS v. BROWN 
tention that the so-called "plain view" doctrine justified the 
police seizure. Because of apparent uncertainty concerning 
the scope and applicability of this doctrine, we granted cer-
tiorari, -- U. S. --, and now reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Criminal Appeals. 
On a summer evening in June, 1979, Harold Maples, an of-
ficer of the Fort Worth police force, assisted in setting up a 
routine driver's license checkpoint on East Allen Street in 
thatcrtY~Si10rtiYberOreiiiliii1lght Maples stopped an auto-
mobile driven by respondent Brown, who was alone. Stand-
ing alongside the driver's window of Brown's car, Maples 
asked him for his driver's license. At roughly the same 
time, Maples shined his flashlight into the car and saw Brown 
withdraw his right hand from his right pants pocket. 
Caught between the two middle fingers of the hand was an 
opaque, green party balloon, knotted about one half inch -from the tip. Brown let the balloon fall to the seat beside his 
leg, and then reached across the passenger seat and opened 
the glove compartment. 
Because of his previous experience in arrests for drug of-
fenses, Maples testified that he was aware that narcotics fre-
State, supra. Neither decision supports the proposition that the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals based its decision upon state law. In Howard, 
the State argued that the plain view doctrine justified the seizure of a 
closed translucent medicine jar from an automobile. The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals rejected the claim, relying on Coolidge v. New Hampshire , 
supra, and stating that the State's arguments "cannot be squared with the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the plain view doctrine." 599 S.W. 2d, 
at 602. The court also relied on Thomas v. State, supra, which it charac-
terized as "[f]ollowing the teachings of Coolidge v. New Hampshire." I d. 
An additional opinion of the court on the State's Motion for Rehearing 
merely elaborated upon the application of the plain view doctrine set forth 
in the court's original opinion. Similarly, in Duncan, the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals rejected the State's reliance on the plain view theory, citing to 
Coolidge for a statement of the applicable law, as well as to Nicholas v. 
State, 502 S.W. 2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973). Like the court's other deci-
sions in the area, Nicholas relied only on Coolidge. 
81-419-0PINION 
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quently were packaged in balloons like the one in Brown's 
hand. When he saw the balloon, Maples shifted his position 
in order to obtain a better view of the interior of the glove 
compartment. He noticed that it contained several small 
plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder, and an open 
bag of party balloons. After rummaging briefly through the 
glove compartment, Brown told Maples that he had no driv-
er's license in his possession. Maples then instri.ieted him to 
get out onhe car and stand at its rear. Brown complied, 
and, before following him to the rear of the car, Maples 
reached into the car and picked up the green balloon; there 
seemed to be a sort of powdery substance within the tied-off 
portion of the balloon. 
Maples then displayed the balloon to a fellow officer who 
indicated that he "understood the situation." The two offi-
cers then advised Brown that he was under arrest. 2 They ---===-
2 It is not clear on the record before us when Brown was arrested. The 
Court of'Cririirnal Appeals stated, at one point in its opinion, that it did not 
question "the propriety of the arrest since appellant failed to produce a 
driver's license." This statement might be read to suggest that Brown 
was arrested upon his failure to produce a license, instead of at some point 
following seizure of the balloon from the car. The transcript of the sup-
pression hearing, however, indicates rather clearly that Brown was not 
formally arrested until after seizure of the balloon. J. App."'2s::31. In 1fie 
faceorsuch indications, 1/e declme to uiterpret the above-quoted clause 
from the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion as evidencing a belief that an 
arrest occurred prior to seizure of the balloon. Rather, we think it likely 
that the court was simply reasoning that Brown's arrest, whenever it may 
have taken place, was justified because of his failure to produce a driver's 
license. 
We do not address the argument that seizure of the balloon would have 
been justified under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1982), which per-
mits warrantless searches of the passenger compartment of an automobile 
incident to an arrest, because of the absence of clear factual findings re-
garding the time at which, and the reason for which, Brown was arrested 
and because the lower court was not able to consider that decision. Like-
wise, we do not rest our decision on United States v. Ross,-- U. S. --
(1982). 
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also conducted an on-the-scene inventory of Brown's car, 
discovering several p as 1c ags containing a green leafy sub-
stance and a large bottle of milk sugar. These items, like the 
balloon, were seized by the officers. At the suppression 
hearing conducted by the District Court, a police department 
chemist testified that he had examined the substance in the 
balloon seized by Maples and determined that it was heroin. 
He also testified that narcotics frequently were packaged in 
ordinary party balloons. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals, discussing the Fourth 
Amendment issue, observed that "plain view alone is never 
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Pet. 
A-10, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
468 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, Douglas, BRENNAN and MAR-
SHALL, JJ.) It further concluded that "Officer Maples had to 
know that 'incriminatory evidence was before him when he 
seized the balloon."' Pet. A-ll (emphasis supplied), quoting 
DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289, 291 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977). 
On the state's petition for rehearing, three judges dissented, 
stating their view that "[t]he issue turns on whether an offi-
cer, relying on years of practical experience and knowledge 
commonly accepted, has probable cause to seize the balloon in 
plain view." Pet. A-15, 16. 
Because the "plain view" doctrine generally is invoked in 
conjunction with other Fourth Amendment principles, such 
as those relating to warrants, probable cause, and search in-
cident to arrest, we rehearse briefly these better understood 
principles of Fourth Amendment law. That amendment se-
cures the persons, houses, papers and effects of the people 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and requires the 
existence of probable cause before a warrant shall issue. 
Our c~~es hold that proceduretby wa~ of a warrant is J)re-
ferred, although in a wide range otdiverse situations we have 
recog:ruzeal1eXI6Ie, common-sense exceptions to this prefer-
ence.----see, e. g., Warden v. l1ayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967) 
(hot pursuit); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51-52 
T~C( -
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(1951) (exigent circumstances); United States v. Ross, --
U. S. -- (1982) (automobile search); Chimel v. California, 
395 U. S. 752 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 
218 (1973); and New York v. Belton, 453 U .. S. 454 (1982) 
(search of person and surrounding area incident to arrest); 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973) 
(search at border or "functional equivalent"); Zap v. United 
States, 328 U. S. 624, 630 (1946) (consent). We have also 
held to be permissible intrusions less severe than full-scale 
searches or seizures without the necessity of a warrant. 
See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, supra, (stop and frisk); United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, (seizure for questioning); 
Delaware v. Prouse, supra, (roadblock). One frequently I 
mentioned "exception to the warrant requirement," Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at 443, is the so-called 
"plain view" doctrine, relied upon by the state in this case. 
While conceding that the green balloon seized by Officer 
Maples was clearly visible to him, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held that the state might not avail itself of the "plain 
view" doctrine. That court said: 
"For the plain view doctrine to apply, not only must 
the officer be legitimately in a position to view the ob-
ject, but it must be immediately apparent to the police 
that they have evidence before them. This 'immedi-
ately apparent' aspect is central to the plain view excep-
tion and is here relied upon by appellant. (Citation omit-
ted). In this case then, Officer Maples had to know that 
'incriminatory evidence was before him when he seized 
the balloon."' Petn. A-10, A-11. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals based its conclusion primarily 
on the plurality opinion of this Court in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, supra. In the Coolidge plur~'s vi~w, the 
"plain view" doctrine permits the warrantless seizure by po-
I 
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lice of private p6ssessions where three requirements are sat-
isfied. 3 First, the police officer must lawfully make an "ini-
tial intrusion" or otherwise properly be in a position from 
which he can view a particular area. I d., at 465-468. Sec-
~ the officer must discover incriminating evidence "inad-
vertently," which is to say, he may not "know in advance the 
location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it," relying 
on the plain view doctrine only as a pretext. !d., at 470. 
Finally, it must be "immediately apparent" to the police that 
the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contra-
band, or otherwise subject to seizure. !d., at 469-470. 
While the lower courts generally have applied the Coolidge 
plurality's discussion of "plain view," it has never ~oeen ex-
pressl;r ado,eted by a majority of this Court. On the con-
trary, the plurality's formulation was sharply criticized at the 
time, see, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at 
506 (Black, J., dissenting); id., at 51~21 (WHITE, J., dis-
senting). While not a binding precedent, as the considered 
opinion of four Members of this Court it should obviously be 
the point of reference for further discussion of the issue. 
The Coolidge plurality observed, "It is important to keep 
in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence 
seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the mo-
ment of seizure," simply as "the normal concomitant of any 
search, legal or illegal." 403 U. S., at 465. The question 
whether property in plain v) ew of the police may ge seized 
therefore must turn on thl legality of the intrusio~ that en-
8 The plurality also remarked that "plain view alone is never enough to 
justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
supra, 403 U. S., at 468. The court below appeared to understand this 
phrase to impose an independent limitation upon the scope of the plain view 
doctrine articulated in Coolidge. The context in which the plurality used 
the phrase, however, indicates that it was merely a rephrasing of its con-
clusion, discussed below, that in order for the plain view doctrine to apply, 
a police officer must be engaged in a lawful intrusion or must otherwise 
legitimately occupy the position affording him a "plain view." 
7 
81-41~0PINION 
TEXAS v. BROWN 7 
ables them to perceive and physically seize the property in 
question. The Coolidge plurality, while following this view 
of the "plain view" doctrine, characterized the doctrine as an 
exception to the warrant requirement. We think this may 
be somewhat inaccurate. That characterization, for exam-
ple, describes application of the doctrine to seizures of prop-
erty found in public areas very poorly. If police encountered 
contraband or evidence of a crime concealed in a public park 
few would suggest that the warrant clause had any applica-
bility at all, and reliance upon some "exception" would be 
completely unnecessary. 
"Plain view" can probably be better understood simply as 
an application of the reasonableness requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment to seiZures of property. It is grounded 
on the recognition that when a police officer has observed an 
object in "plain view," the owner's remaining interests in the 
object are merely those of possession and ownership, see 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at 515 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Likewise, it reflects the fact that 
requiring police to obtain a warrant once they have obtained 
a first-hand perception of contraband, stolen property or in-
criminating evidence generally would be a "needless inconve-
nience," 403 U. S., at 468, that might involve danger to the 
police and public. I d. We have said previously that "the 
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is 
judged by balancing its intrusion on ... Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental in-
terests." Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U. S., at 654. In 
light of the private and governmental interests just outlined, 
our decisions have come to reflect the rule that if, while law-
fully engaged in an activity in a particular place, police offi-
cers perceive a suspicious object, they may seize it immedi-
ately. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S 192 (1927); 
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 358 
(1931); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 465 (1932); 
Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968); Frazier v. 
c;.t+emf't W rtduc.< 
~&.V"'fl'l ~ndmtJd tv 
cjf 
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Cupp, 394 U. S. 731 (1969). This rule merely reflects an 
application of the Fourth Amendment's ~ent 
o~ rea~~ss to the law governing seizures of property. 
Applying these principles, we conclude that Officer Maples 
properly seized the green balloon from Brown's automobile. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it did not "ques-
tion ... the validity of the officer's initial stop of appellant's 
vehlcle as a part o a license c eck, et. A-10, and we 
agree. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979). 
It is likewise beyond dispute that Maples' action in shining 
his flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown's car 
trenched upon no right secured to the latter by the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court said in United States v. Lee, 274 
U. S. 559, 563 (1927), that "[The] use of a searchlight is com-
parable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not 
prohibited by the Constitution." Numerous other courts 
have agreed that the use of artificial means to illuminate a 
darkened area simply does not constitute a search, and thus 
triggers no Fourth Amendment protection. 4 
Likewise, the fact that Maples "changed [his] position" and 
"bent down at an angle so [he] could see what was inside" 
Brown's car, J. App., at 16, is irrelevant to Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. The general public could peer into the inte-
rior of Brown's automobile from any number of angles; there 
• E. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1352, 1356--1357, n. 2 (CA 9 
1982); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F. 2d 421, 427 (CA 2 1981); United 
States v. Pugh, 566 F. 2d 626, 627, n. 2 (CA 81977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 
1010 (1978); United States v. Coplen, 541 F. 2d 211 (CA 9 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U. S. 1073 (1977); United States v. Lara, 517 F. 2d 209 (CA 5 
1975); United States v. Johnson, 506 F. 2d 674 (CA 8 1974), cert. denied, 
421 U. S. 917 (1975); United States v. Booker, 461 F. 2d 990, 992 (CA 6 
1972); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F. 2d 649 (CA 7 1971); People v. 
Waits, 580 P. 2d 391 (Colo. 1978); Redd v. State, 243 S.E. 2d 16 (Ga. 1978); 
State v. Chattley, 390 A. 2d 472 (Me. 1978); State v. Vohnoutka, 292 
N. W.2d 756 (Minn. 1980); Dick v. State, 596 P. 2d 1265 (Okla.Cr. 1979); 
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is no reason Maples should be precluded from observing as an 
officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private citi-
zen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy, Katz v. 
United States, supra, 389 U. S., at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 739-745 
(1979), shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile 
which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either in-
quisitive passersby or diligent police officers. In short, the 
conduct that enabled Maples to observe the interior of 
Brown's car and of his open glove compartment was not a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Thus there can be no dispute here as to the presence of the 
first of the three requirements held necessary Ey tne . coo-
lt"'i!{je p ura 1ty to mvoke the "plain view" doctrine. 5 But the 
Court of Criminal Appeals, as we have noted, felt the state's 
case ran aground on the requirement that the incriminating 
nature of the items be "immediately apparent" to the police 
officer. To the Court of Appeals, this apparently meant that 
the officer must be possessed of near certainty as to the 
seizable nature of the items. Decisions by this Court since 
Coolidge indicate that the use of the phrase "immediately ap-
parent" was very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it 
can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty 
as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for 
an application of the "plain view" doctrine. 
In Colorado v. Bannister, supra, 449 U. S., at 3--4, we ap-
plied what was in substance the plain view doctrine to an offi-
5 While seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion 
into Brown's automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining re-
quirements of the plain view doctrine were satisfied. The "Fourth 
Amendment protects people not places." Katz v. United States, supra, 
389 U. S. , at 351. Officer Maples' action was a limited intrusion, see Ad-
ams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), directed only to retrieving an object 
in plain view and not offering the officer an opportunity to engage in the 
type of "general exploratory search" condemned in Coolidge. As such, it 
was entirely reasonable. 
L- 1 · 0 .,r cJ.oes 
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cer's seizure of evidence from an automobile. I d., at n. 4. 
The officer noticed that the occupants of the automobile 
matched a description of persons suspected of a theft and that 
auto parts in the open glove compartment of the car similarly 
resembled ones reported stolen. The Court held that these 
facts supplied the officer with "probable cause," id., at 4, and 
therefore, that he could seize the incriminating items from 
the car without a warrant. Plainly, the Court did not view 
the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge as estab-
lishing any requirement that a police officer "know" that cer-
tain items are contraband or evidence of a crime. Indeed, 
Colorado v. Bannister, supra, was merely an application of 
the rule, set forth in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (.d. · fill) 
(1980), that "[t]he seizure o1 property in plain view involves / I( 
no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, as-
suming that there is robable cause to associate the ro erly 
wit crtmma activity." I d., at 587 (emphasis added). We 
th~nt of the rule from Payton, supra, requir-
ing probable cause for seizure in the ordinary case, 6 is con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and we reaffirm it here. 
As the Court frequently has remarked, probable cause is a 1 
flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that ~ . VV'( J 
the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man 0 rea-
sonable caution in the belief," Carroll v. ~i d tes, 267 
U. S. 132, 162 (1925), that certain ite may be contraband "'t!- prob · 
or stolen property o~ful aS' evidence o a cr~ it does not ""fVlr~ f t 1,~~ 
demand any showing t at such a beliefoe correct CfPAV () so ~lt~oltO' 
~ikely u tte than false. A "practical, nontechnical" probabil- fh#l! 5°' 
ity that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is re-
6 We need not address in this case whether some degree of suspicion 
lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure in certain 
cases. While such seizures would not fit within the "presumptively rea-
sonable>' rule o ayton, which requires the existence of probable cause, 
they nenetheless might be reasonable if police were acting in exigent cir-
cumstances or where some other important governmental interest is 
involved. 
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quired. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 
(1949). Moreover, our observation in United States v. Cor-
tez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981), regarding "particularized sus-
picion," is equally applicable to the probable cause 
requirement: 
"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but 
with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities 
was articulated as such, practical people formulated cer-
tain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; 
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and 
so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence 
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of 
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those 
versed in the field of law enforcement." 
With these considerations in mind it is plain that Officer 
Maples possessed probable cause to believe that the balloon 
in Brown's hand contained an illicit substance. Maples testi-
fied that he was aware, both from his participation in previ-
ous narcotics arrests and from discussions with other officers, 
that balloons tied in the manner of the one possessed by 
Brown were frequently used to carry narcotics. This testi-
mony was corroborated by that of a police department chem-
ist who noted that it was "common" for balloons to be used in 
packaging narcotics. In addition, Maples was able to ob-
serve the contents of the glove compartment of Brown's car, 
which revealed further suggestions that Brown was engaged 
in activities that might involve possession of illicit sub-
stances. The fact that Maples could not see through the 
opaque fabric of the balloon is all but irrelevant: the distinc-
tive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its con-
tents-particularly to the trained eye of the officer. 
In addition to its statement that for seizure of objects in 
plain view to be justified the basis upon which they might be 
seized had to be "immediately apparent," and the require-
ment that the initial intrusion be lawful, both of which re-
81-419-0PINION 
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quirements we hold were satisfied here, the Coolidge plural-
ity also stated that the police must discover incriminating 
evidence "inadvertently," which is to say, they may not 
"know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and in-
tend to seize it," relying on the plain view doctrine only as a 
pretense. Id., at 470. Whatever may be the final dispo-
sition of the "inadvertence" element of "plain view," 7 it 
clearly was no bar to the seizure here. As in the related case 
of warrantless searches based on an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the circumstances of 
this meeting between Maples and Brown give no suggestion 
that the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcot-
ics violation might be uncovered in "plain view" in the course 
of a check for driver's licenses. Here, although the officers 
no doubt had an expectation that some of the cars they halted 
on East Allen Street-which was part of a "medium" area of 
narcotics traffic, J . App., at 33-would contain narcotics or 
paraphernalia, there is no indication in the record that they 
had anything beyond this generalized expectation. Like-
wise, there is no indication that Maples had any reason to be-
lieve that any particular object would be in Brown's glove 
compartment or elsewhere in his automobile. The "inadver-
tence" requirement of "plain view," properly understood, 
was no bar to the seizure here. 
Maples lawfully viewed the green balloon in the interior of 
Brown's car, and had probable cause to believe that it was 
subject to seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The judg-
ment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is accordingly 
reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
7 See State v. King, 191 N. W. 2d 650, 655 (Iowa 1971); United States v. 
Santana, 485 F . 2d 365, 369-370 (CA 2 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 931 
(1974); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F . 2d 1097, 1101, n. t{CA 4 1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 895 (1974); North v. Superior Court, 502 P. 2d 1305, 
1308 (Calif. 1972). \ 
rfjCC't~ 
~w·$t$ no- <;urv~t'AJ 
LFf wtll be vot( f b 
('d.V\ ~~IAirtiMCIIIf 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JL.ISTtCE 
.iu:.punu Qfltttrl.of tlrt Jfuittb .itaftg 
'Jiragipnghtn, ~. (!}. 2!lbT~.;t 
February 21, 1983 




Copies to the Conference 
/ 
mfs 02/21/83 
first draft: Texas v. Brown, No. 81-419 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), a 
plurality of this Court recognized three requirements for a 
"plain view" search and seizure. A police officer without a war-
rant may seize evidence in plain view when (i) the officer's ini-
tial intrusion is lawful,l id., at 465-466; (ii) the officer's 
discovery of the evidence is inadvertent, id., at 469-471; and 
(iii) it is "immediately apparent" to the officer that he has 
evidence before him, id., at 466. More recently, we explained in 
dicta that the "immediately apparent" requirement means that the 
officer must have "probable cause to associate the property [to 
be seized] with criminal activity." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 587 (1980). Cf. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 u.s. 1 (1980) 
(per 
statement of the plain 
f 
spondent 
does not was law-
ful. Respondent ~ concedes that the discovery of the tied-off 
balloon was inadvertent. Ace~~~~, the on~y iss~ £or~ trre 
1The initial intrusion may be lawful for any of several rea-
sons. It may be supported by a warrant unrelated to the seizure 
at issue. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443, 465 (1971) 
(plurality opinion) • It may fall with in one of the recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id., at 465-466. Or it 
may be justified because the officer has-nsome other legitimate 
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed 
against the accused." Id., at 466. 
first draft: Texas v. Brown, No. 81-419 page 2. 
a1J.D 
It is clear to me E-h-e- ;req-
A --~------------------~---------------------
loons similar to the one at issue here. Other officers ~ had 
told him of such cases. Even if it were not generally known that 
a balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics, 3 
we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his 
training and experience to draw inferences and make deductions 
that might well elude an untrained person. United States v. Cor-
~ ~1-aJ .. -..,.<•f. ~ 
tez, 449 u.s. 411, 418 (1981). Moreover, tbQre aees~et seem to 
~ ee any innocent item that is commonly carried in an uninflated, 
tied-off balloon such as the one Officer Maples seized. 
All of the requirements for a plain view search and sei-
zure having been satisfied here, I agree that the decision below 
must be reversed. 
2I do not accept respondent's argument that the decision 
below was based on state law, and thus is not reviewable here. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied directly on Coolidge, 
supra, and on several state cases, each of which relied, either 
directly or indirectly, on Coolidge. Neither the decision below 
nor the cases it cites indicates any reliance on relevant state 
law grounds. 
3The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, despite its decision 
here, recognized this common use of balloons in DeLao v. State, 
5 50 S . W. 2 d 2 8 9 , 2 91 ( 19 7 7 ) . C f . i d . , at 2 9 2 ( Doug 1 as , J • , d i s-
senting) ("[I] t is common knowledge that users and sellers of 
narcotics carry the substance on their person in rubber balloons, 
often called fingerstalls."). 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443 (1971), a 
plurality of this Court recognized three requirements for a 
"plain view" search and seizure. A police officer without a war-
rant may seize evidence in plain view when (i) the officer's ini-
tial intrusion is lawful, 1 id., at 465-466; (ii) the officer's 
discovery of the evidence is inadvertent, id., at 469-471; and 
(iii) it is "immediately apparent" to the officer that he has 
evidence before him, id., at 466. More recently, we explained in 
dicta that the "immediately apparent" requirement means that the 
officer must have "probable cause to associate the property [to 
be seized] with criminal activity." Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 
573, 587 (1980). Cf. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) 
(per curiam) . 
The plain view requirements of Coolidge are satisfacto-
rily met in this case. 2 Respondent does not dispute that Offi-
1The initial intrusion may be lawful for any of several rea-
sons. It may be supported by a warrant unrelated to the seizure 
at issue. Coolidge, 403 U.S., at 465. It may fall within one of 
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id., at 
465-466. Or it may be justified because the officer haS"some 
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a 
search directed against the accused." Id., at 466. 
2 I do not accept respondent's argument that the decision be-
low was based on state law, and thus is not reviewable here. The 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied directly on Coolidge, 
supra, and on several state cases, each of which relied, either 
directly or indirectly, on Coolidge. Neither the decision below 
nor the cases it cites indicate any reliance on relevant state 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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cer Maples' initial intrusion was lawful. Respondent concedes 
that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent. If 
probable cause must be shown, as the Payton dicta suggests, I 
think it is clear that it existed here. Officer Maples testified 
that he previously had made an arrest in a case where narcotics 
were carried in tied-off balloons similar to the one at issue 
here. Other officers had told him of such cases. Even if it 
were not generally known that a balloon is a common container for 
carrying illegal narcotics, 3 we have recognized that a law en-
forcernent officer may rely on his training and experience to draw 
inferences and make deductions that might well elude an untrained 
person. United States v. Cortez, 449 u.s. 411, 418 (1981). 
Moreover, we are are not advised of any innocent i tern that is 
commonly carried in an uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the 
one Officer Maples seized. 
All of the requirements for a plain view search and sei-
zure having been satisfied here, I agree that the decision below 
must be reversed. 
law grounds. 
3The Texas Court of Cr irninal Appeals, despite its decision 
here, recognized this common use of balloons in DeLao v. State, 
550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (1977). Cf. id., at 292 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) ("[I] t is common knowledge that users and sellers of 
narcotics carry the substance on their person in rubber balloons, 
often called fingerstalls.") • 
. .. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. ]o copie5 
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the 
Court's opinion relating to the application in this case of the 
plain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not join 
the Court's opinion because it goes well beyond the application 
of the plain view exception. As I read the opinion, it appears 
to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment than is justified by the language and purpose of that 
Amendment. In dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 u.s. 
56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote eloquently: 
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the 
text and context and historic content of the Fourth 
Amendment. • . . When [that] Amendment outlawed 
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the 
very restricted authority that even a search warrant 
issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said 
with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a 
search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes 
it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute ne-
e e s s i ty . " I d . , at 7 0 • 
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause 
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected dis-
agreement among Justices as to the extent to which the Clause 
defines the reasonableness standard of the Amendment. In one of 
my earliest opinions, United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 u.s. 297 (1972), I cited Justice Frankfurter's Rabino-
witz dissent in emphasizing the importance of the Warrant Clause. 
Id., at 316. Although I would not say that exceptions can be 
justified only by "absolute necessity," 1 I stated that they were 
1 I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as 
one clearly justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
page 2. 
"few in number and carefully delineated." Id. , at 318. This has 
continued to be my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 u.s. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently re-
peated by this Court. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798, (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) 
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Munic-
ipal Court, 387 u.s. 523, 528-5/.9 (1967); Jones v. United States, 
357 u.s. 493, 499 (1958). 
This case involves an application of the plain view excep-
tion, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion in 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Court today 
states that this opinion "has never been expressly adopted by a 
majority of this Court." Ante, at 6. Whatever my view may have 
been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date 
to imply criticism of its articulation of this exception. It has 
been accepted generally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems 
e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 u.s. 753, 760-761 (1979); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., 
concurring). 
2see, e.g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353, 1356-
1357 (CA9 1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554, 558-560 
(CAl 1982); United States v. Tolerton, 669 F.2d 652, 653-655 
( CA 10 ) , c e r t. denied, U.S • ( 19 8 2 ) ; On i ted States v • 
Antill, 615 F.2d 648, 6~(CA5) (per curiam), cert. den1ed, 449 
u.s. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309, 1313-
1314 (CAS 1978); United States v. Williams, 523 F.2d 64, 66-67 
(CAB 1975), cert. denied, 423 u.s. 1090 (1976); United States v. 
Truitt, 521 F.2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. 
Pacelli, 470 F.2d 67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 u.s. 
983 (1973); United States v. Drew, 451 F.2d 230, 232-234 (CAS 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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unnecessary to cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurali-
ty formulation is dispositive of the question before us. 
Respondent does not dispute that Officer Maples' initial 
intrusion was lawful. Respondent also concedes that the discov-
ery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was ob-
served in the course of a lawful inspect ion of the front seat 
area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as the 
Payton dicta suggests, 3 I think it is clear that it existed here. 
Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an arrest in 
a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons similar 
to the one at issue here. Other officers had told him of such 
cases. Even if it were not generally known that a balloon is a 
common container for carrying illegal narcotics, we have recog-
nized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training and 
experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well 
elude an untrained person. United States v. Cortez, 449 u.s. 
411, 418 {1981). We are not advised of any innocent item that is 
commonly carried in uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the one 
Officer Maples seized. 
Accordingly, I join the Court's judgment as it is consistent 
with princples established by our prior decisions. 
1971). 
3see Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 573, 587 {1980). Although 
probable cause was present in this case, I note with approval 
that the Court recognizes--without deciding--that reasonable sus-
picion of illegal activity may be sufficient to justify a seizure 
in some cases. See ante, at 7, n. 4, and 11, n. 7. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the 
Court's opinion relating to the application in this case of the 
plain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not 
join the Court's opinion because it goes well beyond the appli-
cation o exception. As I read the opinion, it 
appears to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of 
the Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and 
purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote 
eloquently: 
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the 
text and context and historic content of the Fourth 
Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed 
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the 
very restricted authority that even a search warrant is-
sued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all 
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unrea- __ 
sonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only e:x=-
ceptions justified by absolute necessity." I d., at 7~] // 
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause 
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected 
disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the 
Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amend-
s 
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ment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited 
Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the 
importance of theW arrant Clause. I d., at 316. Although I 
would not say that exceptions can be justified only by "abso-
lute necessity," 1 I stated that they were "few in number and 
carefully delineated." Id., at 318. This has continued to be 
my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by 
this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 
-- (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978) 
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34 
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 52~29 (1967); 
Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958). 
This case involves an application of the plain view excep-
tion, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion 
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The 
Court today states that this opinion "has never been ex-
ressly adopted by a majority of this Court." Ante, at 6. 
----~Wh!==:"'-atever my view~ have been when Coolidge was de-
cided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its 
articulation of this exception. It has been accepted gener-
ally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to 
1 I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly 
justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). 
2 See, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 1356-1357 (CA9 
1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 558-560 (CA11982); United 
States v. Tolerton, 669 F . 2d 652, 653-655 (CAlO), cert. denied,- U. S. 
- (1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F . 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F. 2d 
1309, 1313-1314 (CA5 1978); United States v. Williams, 523 F. 2d 64, 66-67 
(CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt, 
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cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurality formulation 
is dispositive of the question before us. 
Respondent does not dispute that Officer Maples' initial in-
trusion was lawful. Respondent also concedes that the dis-
covery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was 
observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front seat 
area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as 
the Payton dicta suggests,3 I think it is clear that it existed 
here. Officer Maples testified that he previously had made 
an arrest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off 
balloons similar to the one at issue here. Other officers had 
told him of such cases. Even if it were not generally known 
that a balloon is a common container for carrying illegal nar-
cotics, we have recognized that a law enforcement officer 
may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences 
and make deductions that might well elude an untrained per-
son. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). 
We are not advised of any innocent item that is commonly 
carried in uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the one Officer 
Maples seized. = 
---.;.A;.:c::.::c.:::or:,.::d:.::ingly, I · the Court's judgment as it is consistent 
with prin les estab shed by our prior decisions. 
521 F . 2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F . 2d 
67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v. 
Drew, 451 F. 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971). 
3 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). Although proba-
ble cause was present in this case, I note with approval that the Court rec-
ognizes-without deciding-that reasonable suspicion of illegal activity 
may be sufficient to justify a seizure in some cases. See ante, at 7, n. 4, 
and 11, n. 7. 
3JUSTICE STEVENS, in his dissent, addresses the legality of the 
State's search of the balloon as well as of its seizure. See 
post, at 5-6. As Brown's counsel stated at oral argument that 
his client "did not object to the opening of the balloon", Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 47, I think it unnecessarv to reach the search question 
although I am inclined to agree with the implicit concession 
of counsel that if the seizure was lawful there was little or no 
remaining expectation of privacy in the balloon. 
mfs 02/23/83 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
~~~~~ 
~4~ .. 
403 u.s. 443 {1971), a 
plurality of this Court recognized three requirements for a 
"plain view" search and seizure. A police officer without a war-
rant may seize evidence in plain view when {i) the officer's ini-
tial intrusion is lawful, 1 id., at 465-466; {ii) the officer's 
discovery of the evidence is inadvertent, id., at 469-471; and 
{iii) it is "immediately apparent" to the officer that he has 
evidence before him, id., at 466. More recently, we explained in 
dicta that the "immediately apparent" requirement means that the 
officer must have "probable cause to associate the property [to 
be seized] with criminal activity." Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 
573, 587 {1980). Cf. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 {1980) 
{per curiam) • 
The plain view requirements of Coolidge are satisfacto-
rily met in this case. 2 Respondent does not dispute that Offi-
cer Maples' initial intrusion was lawful. Respondent concedes 
1The initial intrusion may be lawful for any of several rea-
sons. It may be supported by a warrant unrelated to the seizure 
at issue. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 {1971) 
{plurality opinion). It may fall within one of the recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id., at 465-466. Or it 
may be justified because the officer has-nsome other legitimate 
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed 
against the accused." Id., at 466. 
2 I do not accept respondent's argument that the decision 
below was based on state law, and thus is not reviewable here. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied directly on Coolidge, 
supra, and on several state cases, each of which relied, either 
directly or indirectly, on Coolidge. Neither the decision below 
nor the cases it cites indicates any reliance on relevant state 
law grounds. 
first draft: Texas v. Brown, No. 81-419 page 2. 
that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent. If 
probable cause must be shown, as the Payton dicta suggests, I 
think it is clear that it existed here. Officer Maples testified 
that he previously had made an arrest in a case where narcotics 
were carried in tied-off balloons similar to the one at issue 
here. Other officers had told him of such cases. Even if it 
were not generally known that a balloon is a common container for 
carrying illegal narcotics, 3 we have recognized that a law en-
forcement officer may rely on his training and experience to draw 
inferences and make deductions that might well elude an untrained 
person. United States v. Cortez, 449 u.s. 411, 418 (1981). 
Moreover, we are are not advised of any innocent i tern that is 
commonly carried in an uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the 
one Officer Maples seized. 
All of the requirements for a plain view search and sei-
zure having been satisfied here, I agree that the decision below 
must be reversed. 
3The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, despite its decision 
here, recognized this common use of balloons in DeLao v. State, 
550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (1977). Cf. id., at 292 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) ("[I] t is common knowleage that users and sellers of 
narcotics carry the substance on their person in rubber balloons, 
often called fingerstalls."). 
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[February - , 1983] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent Clifford James Brown was convicted in the 
District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, for possession of 
heroin in violation of state law. The Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that evidence intro-
duced at his trial should have been suppressed because it was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 1 That c~ur rejected the state's con-
, Brown argues that the ~J rested on an independent and ad-
equate state ground, and therefore that this Court lacks jurisdiction. Fox 
Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). The position is untena-
ble. The opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rests squarely on 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Con-
~ ;_,uf!.-.-1~~ ......... _.., ...... - stitution in -Goolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), and on 
1 l[d,~~~:1.,.,~'-#~~~~~~·~erpreting that decision, e. g., Howard v. State, 599 S. W. 2d 
2---2- 597 (Tex. r. App. 1979); DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289 (Tex. Cr. App. 
__ g 1977); Duncan v. State, 549 S. W. 2d 730 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977); and N icho-
Q las v. State, 502 S. W. 2d 169 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973). The only mention of 
k the Texas Constitution occurs in a summary of Brown's contentions at the 
/J . ~ . ~f-A-> outset of the lower court's opinion. In a field like the Fourth Amendment, 
~"'i where the federal courts have been so active in imposing standards on state 
J7~ ~ - and local activities, a more affirmative indication in the opinion of the state 
, ,I ~ court of reliance on state law is necessary before we will reject the likely 
~=~~--~~/A explanation that "the [state] court felt compelled by what it understood to 
 ~- • ~ be federal constitutional considerations" to reach the result it did. Zac-
chini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. , 433 U. S. 562, 568 (1977). 
Brown relies principally on Howard v. State, supra, and Duncan v. 
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tention that the so-called "plain view" doctrine justified the 
police seizure. Because of apparent uncertainty concerning 
the scope and applicability of this doctrine, we granted cer-
tiorari, -- U. S. --, and now reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Criminal Appeals. 
On a summer evening in June, 1979, Harold Maples, an of-
ficer of the Fort Worth police force, assisted in setting up a 
routine driver's license checkpoint on East Allen Street in 
that city. Shortly before midnight Maples stopped an auto-
mobile driven by respondent Brown, who was alone. Stand-
ing alongside the driver's window of Brown's car, Maples 
asked him for his driver's license. At roughly the same 
time, Maples shined his flashlight into the car and saw Brown 
withdraw his right hand from his right pants pocket. 
Caught between the two middle fingers of the hand was an 
opaque, green party balloon, knotted about one half inch 
from the tip. Brown let the balloon fall to the seat beside his 
leg, and then reached across the passenger seat and opened 
the glove compartment. 
Because of his previous experience in arrests for drug of-
fenses, Maples testified that he was aware that narcotics fre-
State, supra. Neither decision supports the proposition that the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals based its decision upon state law. In Howard, 
the State argued that the plain view doctrine justified the seizure of a 
closed translucent medicine jar from an automobile. The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals rejected the claim, relying on Coolidge v. N ew Hampshire, 
supra, and stating that the State's arguments "cannot be squared with the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the plain view doctrine." 599 S. W. 2d, 
at 602. The court also relied on Thomas v. State, supra, which it charac-
terized as "[f]ollowing the teachings of Coolidge v. New Hampshire." 
Ibid . An additional opinion of the court on the State's Motion for Rehear-
ing merely elaborated upon the application of the plain view doctrine set 
forth in the court's original opinion. Similarly, in Duncan, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals rejected the State's reliance on the plain view theory, cit-
ing to Coolidge for a statement of the applicable law, as well as to Nicholas 
v. State, 502 S. W. 2d 169 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973). Like the court's other 
decisions in the area, Nicholas relied only on Coolidge. 
81-419-0PINION 
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quently were packaged in balloons like the one in Brown's 
hand. When he saw the balloon, Maples shifted his position 
in order to obtain a better view of the interior of the glove 
compartment. He noticed that it contained several small 
plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder, and an open 
bag of party balloons. After rummaging briefly through the 
glove compartment, Brown told Maples that he had no driv-
er's license in his possession. Maples then instructed him to 
get out of the car and stand at its rear. Brown complied, 
and, before following him to the rear of the car, Maples 
reached into the car and picked up the green balloon; there 
seemed to be a sort of powdery substance within the tied-off 
portion of the balloon. 
Maples then displayed the balloon to a fellow officer who 
indicated that he "understood the situation." The two offi-
cers then advised Brown that he was under arrest. 2 They 
2 1t is not clear on the record before us when Brown was arrested. The 
Court of Criminal Appeals stated, at one point in its opinion, that it did not 
question "the propriety of the arrest since appellant failed to produce a 
driver's license." This statement might be read to suggest that Brown 
was arrested upon his failure to produce a license, instead of at some point 
following seizure of the balloon from the car. The transcript of the sup-
pression hearing, however, indicates rather clearly that Brown was not 
formally arrested until after seizure of the balloon. J . App. 28-31. In the 
face of such indications, we decline to interpret the above-quoted clause 
from the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion as evidencing a belief that an 
arrest occurred prior to seizure of the balloon. Rather, we think it likely 
that the court was simply reasoning that Brown's arrest, whenever it may 
have taken place, was justified because of his failure to produce a driver's 
license. 
We do not address the argument that seizure of the balloon would have 
been justified under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1982), which per-
mits warrantless searches of the passenger compartment of an automobile 
incident to an arrest, because of the absence of clear factual findings re-
garding the time at which, and the reason for which, Brown was arrested 
and because the lower court was not able to consider that decision. Like-
wise, we do not rest our decision on United States v. Ross,-- U. S. --
(1982). 
81-419--0PINION 
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also conducted an on-the-scene inventory of Brown's car, 
discovering several plastic bags containing a green leafy sub-
stance and a large bottle of milk sugar. These items, like the 
balloon, were seized by the officers. At the suppression 
hearing conducted by the District Court, a police department 
chemist testified that he had examined the substance in the 
balloon seized by Maples and determined that it was heroin. 
He also testified that narcotics frequently were packaged in 
ordinary party balloons. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals, discussing the Fourth 
Amendment issue, observed that "plain view alone is never 
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Pet. 
A-10, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
468 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, Douglas, BRENNAN and MAR-
SHALL, JJ.) It further concluded that "Officer Maples had to 
know that 'incriminatory evidence was before him when he 
seized the balloon."' Pet. A-ll (emphasis supplied), quoting 
DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289, 291 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977). 
On the state's petition for rehearing, three judges dissented, 
stating their view that "[t]he issue turns on whether an offi-
cer, relying on years of practical experience and knowledge 
commonly accepted, has probable cause to seize the balloon in 
plain view." Pet. A-15, 16. 
Because the "pl~ doctrine generally is invoked in 
con·unction with other Fourth Amendment principles, such 
as those re ating to warran s, pro a e cause, and search in-
cident to arrest, we rehearse briefly these better understood 
princi les of Fourth Amendment law. a amen ment se-
cures tlie rsons, houses, papers and effects of the people 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and requires the 
n ... vl- existence of probable cause before a warrant shall issue. 
~ ( Our cases hold that procedure by way of a warrant !.§...]re-
w-L -· r f~ed, althou h in a wide ran e of diverse situations we have 
~~ · _ 0 reco · e ·b c on-sense exceptiOns to this require-
ment. See, e. g., Warden v. ayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967) 
~~~(hot pursuit); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 
tY1 r ~ 
#vet 
--- ---- - -----------
81-419-0PINION 
TEXAS v. BROWN . 5 
v" 
(1951) (exigent circumstances); United States v. Ross, --
U. S. -- (1982) (rurtomobile search); Chimel v. California, 
395 U. S. 752 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 
218 (1973); and New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1982) 
(search of person and surrounding areaCfncident to arrest); 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973) 
(search att.(order or "functional equivalent"); Zap v. United 
States, 328 U. S. 624, 630 (1946) (consent). We have also 
held to be permissible intrusions less severe than full-scale 
searches or seizures without the necessity of a warrant. 
See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, supra, _t§top and frisk); United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, (seizure for questioning); 
Delaware v. Prouse, supra, "(roadblock). One frequently 
mentioned "exception to the warrant requirement," Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at 443, is the so-called 
"plain view" doctrine, relied upon by the state in this case. 
While conceding that the green balloon seized by Officer 
Maples was clearly visible to him, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held that the state might not avail itself of the "plain 
view" doctrine. That court said: 
"For the plain view doctrine to apply, not only must 
the officer be legitimately in a position to view the ob-
ject, but it must be immediately apparent to the police 
that they have evidence before them. This 'immedi-
ately apparent' aspect is central to the plain view excep-
tion and is here relied upon by appellant. (Citation omit-
ted). In this case then, Officer Maples had to know that 
'incriminatory evidence was before him when he seized 
the balloon."' Petn. A-10, A-11. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals based its conclusion primarily 
on the plurality opinion of this Court in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, supra. In the Coolidge plurality's view, the 
"plain view" doctrine permits the warrantless seizure by po-
- --- -------
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lice of pr~possessions where three requirements are sat-
isfied. 3 ~ the police officer must laWfully make an "ini-
tial intrusion" or otherwise properly be in a position from 
which he can view a particular area. I d., at 465-468. t?ef-
pWthe officer must discover incriminating evidence "inad-
vertently," which is to say, he may not "know in advance the 
location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it," relying 
on the plain view doctrine only as a pretext. ld., at 470. 
~ it must be "iJ?mediately a~arent" to the police that 
~s they observe may fie ev1 ence of a crime, contra-
band, or otherwise subject to seizure. ld., at 469-470. 
While the lower courts generally have applied the Coolidge 
plurality's discussion of "plain view," it has never oeenex-
pressly adopted by a majority of this Court-:- On the con-
trary, t e p urah y s formula 1on was sharply criticized at the 
time, see, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at 
506 (Black, J., dissenting); id., at 51~521 (WHITE, J., dis-
senting). While not a binding precedent, as the considered 
opinion of four Members of this Court it should obviQuslx be 
the point of refere!!_ce J or further disc~sion of the issue. 
The Cooliag;-plurality observed, lrJ:f 1s Important to keep 
in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence 
seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the mo-
ment of seizure," simply as "the normal concomitant of any 
search, legal or illegal." 403 U. S., at 465. The question 
whether property in plain view of the police may be seized 
therefore must turn on the legality of the intrusion that en-
3 The plurality also remarked that "plain view alone is never enough to 
justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
supra, 403 U. S., at 468. The court below appeared to understand this 
phrase to impose an independent limitation upon the scope of the plain view 
doctrine articulated in Coolidge. The context in which the plurality used 
the phrase, however, indicates that it was merely a rephrasing of its con-
clusion, discussed below, that in order for the plain view doctrine to apply, 
a police officer must be engaged in a lawful intrusion or must otherwise 
legitimately occupy the position affording him a "plain view." 
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abies them to perceive and physically seize the property in 
question. The Coolidge plurality, while following this view 
of the "plain view" doctrine;characterized the doctrine as an 
exception to the warrant requirement. We think this may 
be somewhat inaccurate. at characterization, for exam-
ple, describes application of the doctrine to seizures of prop-
erty found in public areas very poorly. If police encountered 
contraband or evidence of a crime concealed in a 2ublic park 
few would suggest that the warrant clause had any applica-
bility at all, and reliance upon some "exception" would be 
completely unnecessary. 
"Plain view" can probably be better understood simply as 
an aPPlication of the reasonableness re uir ment of the 
Fourt men men to seizures o property. It is grounded 
on the recognition that when a_police o:@cer has observed an 
ob~ect in "plain v~w," the_owner's remaining interests rn the 
ob ect are mere those of possession and ownership, see 
Coolidge v. New Hampshtre, supra, 0 U. ., at 515 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Likewise, it reflects the fact that 
requiring police to obtain a warrant once they have obtained 
a first-hand perception of contraband, stolen property or in-
criminating evidence generally would be a "needless inconve-
nience," 403 U. 8., at 468, that might involve danger to the 
police and public. Ibid. We have said previously that "the 
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is 
judged by balancing its intrusion on ... Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental in-
terests." Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U. 8., at 654. In 
light of the private and governmental interests just outlined, 
our decisions have come to reflect the rule that if, while law-
full;y engaged in an activ_i!;y}il a particular ,PlaCe, po~ffi­
cers perceive a SliSpic'iOus ob- ct, tl'i~y may seize it immedi-
ately. ee arron v. United States, 275 U. 8. 192 (1927); 
GO-Hart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. 8. 344, 358 
(1931); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. 8. 452, 465 (1932); 
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Cupp, 394 U. S. 731 (1969). This rule merely reflects an 
application of the Fourth Amendment's c ntral requiremen 
of reasonableness to the law governing seiZures o rope y. 
Applying these principles, we conclude that Officer Maples 
properly seized the green balloon from Brown's automobile. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it did not "ques-
tion ... the validity of the officer's initial stop of appellant's 
vehicle as a part of a license check," Pet. A-10, and we agree. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979). It is 
likewise beyond dispute that Maples' action in shining his 
flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown's car trenched 
upon no right secured to the latter by the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Court said in United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 
563 (1927), that "[The] use of a searchlight is comparable to 
the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited 
by the Constitution." Numerous other courts have agreed 
that the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area 
simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no 
Fourth Amendment protection. 4 
Likewise, the fact that Maples "changed [his] position" and 
"bent down at an angle so [he] could see what was inside" 
Brown's car, J. App., at 16, is irrelevant to Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. The general public could peer into the inte-
rior of Brown's automobile from any number of angles; there 
'E. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1352, 1356-1357, n. 2 (CA9 
1982); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F. 2d 421, 427 (CA2 1981); United 
States v. Pugh, 566 F. 2d 626, 627, n. 2 (CA81977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 
1010 (1978); United States v. Coplen, 541 F. 2d 211 (CA9 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U. S. 1073 (1977); United States v. Lara, 517 F. 2d 209 (CA5 
1975); United States v. Johnson, 506 F . 2d 674 (CA8 1974), cert. denied, 
421 U. S. 917 (1975); United States v. Booker, 461 F. 2d 990, 992 (CA6 
1972); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F. 2d 649 (CA7 1971); People v. 
Waits, 580 P. 2d 391 (Colo. 1978); Redd v. State, 243 S. E. 2d 16 (Ga. 1978); 
State v. Chattley, 390 A. 2d 472 (Me. 1978); State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N. W. 
2d 756 (Minn. 1980); Dick v. State, 596 P. 2d 1265 (Okla. Cr. 1979); State v. 
Miller, 608 P. 2d 595 (Ore. 1980); Alba v. State, 379 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1980). 
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is no reason Maples should be precluded from observing as an 
officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private citi-
zen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy, Katz v. 
United States, supra, 389 U. S., at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 739-745 
(1979), shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile 
which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either in-
quisitive passersby or diligent police officers. In short, the 
conduct that enabled Maples to observe the interior of 
Brown's car and of his open glove compartment was not a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Thus there can be no dispute here as to the presence of the 
first of the three requirements""'heid necessary ) Y the Coo-
lidge plurahTy'"1ornv5Ketlie "plain View" doctrine. 5 But the 
Court of Criminal Appeals, as we have notea, felt the state's 
case ran aground on the requirement that the incriminating 
nature of the items be "immediately apparent" to the police 
officer. To the Court of Appeals, this apparently meant that 
the officer must be possessed of near certainty as to the 
seizable nature of the items. Decisions by this Court since 
Coolidge indicate that the use of the phrase "immediately ap-
parent" was very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it 
can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty 
as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for 
an application of the "plain view" doctrine. 
In Colorado v. Bannister, supra, 449 U. S., at 3-4, we ap-
plied what was in substance the plain view doctrine to an offi-
6 While seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion 
into Brown's automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining re-
quirements of the plain view doctrine were satisfied. The "Fourth 
Amendment protects people not places." Katz v. United States, supra, 
389 U. S., at 351. Officer Maples' action was a limited intrusion, see Ad-
ams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), directed only to retrieving an object 
in plain view and not offering the officer an opportunity to engage in the 
type of "general exploratory search" condemned in Coolidge. As such, it 
was entirely reasonable. 
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cer's seizure of evidence from an automobile. Id., at n. 4. 
The officer noticed that the occupants of the automobile 
matched a description of persons suspected of a theft and that 
auto parts in the open glove compartment of the car similarly 
resembled ones reported stolen. The Court held that these 
facts supplied the officer with "probable cause," id., at 4, and 
therefore, that he could seize the incriminating items from 
the car without a warrant. Plainly, the Court did not view 
the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge as estab-
lishing any requirement that a police officer "know" that cer-
tain items are contraband or evidence of a crime. Indeed, 
Colorado v. Bannister, supra, was merely an application of 
the rule, set forth in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 f 
(1980), that "[t]he ~izure of property in plain view involves 
no invasion of privacy ana tS presumphvely reasonable, .Q!-
suming tha!.._ there is l!.robable cause to associate the property 
with crtmmal actwity." Id., at 587 (emphasis added). We 
thillk this statement of the rule from Payton, supra, requir-
ing probable cause for seizure in the ordinary case, 6 is con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and § reaffirm TI:, here) 
As the Court frequently has remarked, ,erobable cause is a 
flexible common-sense standard. It merely requires that 
the facts availa o eo cer would "warrant a man of rea-
sonable caution in the belief," Carrofi v. United States, 267 
U. S. 132, 162 (1925), that certain items may be contraband 
or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not 
demand any showing that su~ a belief b_e corr~ct Q!..!!lOre 
likely true than false. A "practical, nontec'hnical" probabil-
ity that incr iminating evidence is involved is all that is re-
quired. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 
(1949). Moreover, our observation in United States v. Cor-
tez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981), regarding "particularized 
6 We need not address whether, in some circumstances, a degree of sus- t 
picion lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure in 
certain cases. 
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suspicion," is equally applicable to the probable cause 
requirement: 
"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but 
with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities 
was articulated as such, practical people formulated cer-
tain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; 
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and 
so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence 
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of 
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those 
versed in the field of law enforcement." 
With these considerations in mind it is plain that Officer 
Maples possessed probable cause to believe that the balloon 
in Brown's hand coiitalned an illicit substance. Maples testi-
fied that he was aware, both from his participation in previ-
ous narcotics arrests and from discussions with other officers, 
that balloons tied in the manner of the one possessed by 
Brown were frequently used to carry narcotics. This testi-
mony was corroborated by that of a police department chem-
ist who noted that it was "common" for balloons to be used in 
packaging narcotics. In addition, Maples was able to ob-
serve the contents of the glove compartment of Brown's car, 
which revealed further suggestions that Brown was engaged 
in activities that might involve possession of illicit sub-
stances. The fact that Maples could not see through the 
opaque fabric of the balloon is all but irrelevant: the distinc-
tive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its con-
tents-particularly to the trained eye of the officer. 
In addition to its statement that for seizure of objects in 
plain view to be justified the basis upon which they might be 
seized had to be "immediately apparent," and the require-
ment that the initial intrusion be lawful, both of which re-
quirements we hold were satisfied here, the Coolidge plural-
ity also stated that the police must discover incriminating 
evidence "inadvertently," which is to say, they may not 
--------
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"know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and in-
tend to seize it," relying on the plain view doctrine only as a 
pretense. Id., at 470. Whatever may be the final dispo- [ 
sition of the "inadvertence" element of "plain view," 7 it 
clearly was no bar to the seizure here. As in the related case 
of warrantless searches based on an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the circumstances of 
this meeting between Maples and Brown give no suggestion 
that the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcot-
ics violation might be uncovered in "plain view" in the course 
of a check for driver's licenses. Here, although the officers 
no doubt had an expectation that some of the cars they halted 
on East Allen Street-which was part of a "medium" area of 
narcotics traffic, J. App., at 33---would contain narcotics or 
paraphernalia, there is no indication in the record that they 
had anything beyond this generalized expectation. Like-
wise, there is no indication that Maples had any reason to be-
lieve that any particular object would be in Brown's glove 
compartment or elsewhere in his automobile. The "inadver-
tence" requirement of "plain view," properly understood, 
was no bar to the seizure here. 
Maples lawfully viewed the green balloon in the interior of 
Brown's car, and had probable cause to believe that it was 
subject to seizure unoer the rollftnAmendment. The'"Judg-
ment o e exas ou of nminal Appeals is accordingly 
reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
'See State v. King, 191 N. W. 2d 650, 655 (Iowa 1971); United States v. 
Santana, 485 F. 2d 365, 369--370 (CA2 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 931 
(1974); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F. 2d 1097, 1101, n. 3 (CA4 1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 895 (1974); North v. Superior Court, 502 P. 2d 1305, 
1308 (Calif. 1972). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-419 
TEXAS, PETITIONER v: CLIFFORD JAMES BROWN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS OF TEXAS 
[February - , 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), a plu-
rality of this Court recognized three requirements for a 
"plain view" search and seizure. A police officer without a 
warrant may seize evidence in plain view when (i) the offi-
cer's initial intrusion is lawful, 1 id., at 465-466; (ii) the offi-
cer's discovery of the evidence is inadvertent, id., at 469-471; 
and (iii) it is "immediately apparent" to the officer that he has 
evidence before him, id., at 466. More recently, we ex-
plained in dicta that the "immediately apparent" requirement 
means that the officer must have "probable cause to associate 
the property [to be seized] with criminal activity." Payton 
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980). Cf. Colorado v. 
Bannister, 449 U. S. 1 (1980) (per curiam). 
~ ~~· 2 he plain view 71uirements of Coolidge are satisfactorily 
,0{7- met in this cas~espondent does not dispute that Officer 
' The initial intrusion may be lawful for any of several reasons. It may 
be supported by a warrant unrelated to the seizure at issue. Coolidge, 403 
U. S., at 465. It may fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. I d., at 465-466. Or it may be justified because the 
officer has "some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected 
with a search directed against the accused." I d., at 466. 
2 I do not accept respondent's argument that the decision below was 
based on state law, and thus is not reviewable here. The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals relied directly on Coolidge, supra, and on several state 
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Maples' initial intrusion was lawful. Respondent concedes 
that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent. If 
probable cause must be shown, as the Payton dicta suggests, 
I think it is clear that it existed here. Officer Maples testi-
fied that he previously had made an arrest in a case where 
narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons similar to the one 
at issue here. Other officers had told him of such cases. 
Even if it were not generally known that a balloon is a com-
mon container for carrying illegal narcotics, 3 we have recog-
nized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training 
and experience to draw inferences and make deductions that 
might well elude an untrained person. United States v. Cor-
tez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). Moreover, we are are not ad-
vised of any innocent item that is commonly carried in an 
un_infla~~· tied-off balloon such as the one Officer Maples 
r Seized. ~~/._I ~~ 
'" ,...,.., ~ A All of the requirements £ r a plain view search and seizure · ~ , / 
? pn" · · · below ~ 
cases, each of which relied, either directly or indirectly, on Coolidge. Nei-
ther the decision below nor the cases it cites indicate any reliance on rele-
vant state law grounds. 
3 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, despite its decision here, recog-
nized this common use of balloons in DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289, 291 
(1977). Cf. id., at 292 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is common knowl-
edge that users and sellers of narcotics carry the substance on their person 
in rubber balloons, often called fingerstalls."). 
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I will join your judgment, but 
join your opinion. 




It contains a good many statements that I find 
to reconcile with what I have said in Fourth 
cases - and indeed what the Court has said. I 
few of my concerns. 
'-1--~ 
I thought we took the case because the Texas court ~ 
misapplied the "plain view" rule. Although Coolidge was 
only a plurality decision, federal courts have been follow- ~~ 
ing it for a decade and I have considered it established ~ ~-- _ 1 
law. As I read your opinion you accept Coolidge initially '~~ 
as only a "point of reference" (p. 6), state that it is not ,.9 A...-/- ~1'1 
an exception to the warrant clause (p. 7), but you embrace -d -~ 
the dicta in Payton to the effect that the third inquiry ~-~ 
under the plain view exception is whether there was probable ~- ~ 
cause. (p. 10) As we are not bound by this dicta, I would -~ 
not foreclose the possibility that reasonable suspicion sat-~
isfies the third requirement of the rule. I agree there was , 
probable cause here. ~ ~ 
In any event, it seems to me that your opinion ~ ~ 
will create uncertainty as to the force of the rule and its 
specific content. 
Although you and I have been together on most 
Fourth Amendment cases, we have differed as to the impor-
tance of the warrant clause. I do not think it is subordi-
nate to the reasonableness component. In Sanders v. Arkan-
sas, in accord with a number of our decisions (including 
some of mine) , I emphasized the importance of the warrant 
clause and spoke of exceptions to it as few and "carefully 
drawn". In your opinion in this case you refer to a "wide 
range of diverse situations" in which we have recognized 
"flexible, common-sense exceptions to this requirement". 
2. 
In most situations, there may be little substan-
tive difference in our views. Yet, the language and tone of 
your opinion in this case is different from what I have 
written in several opinions. 
Other statements that puzzle me include the first 
couple of sentences in the first full paragraph on page 7. 
Would an officer be entitled to take a look inside my wallet 
if he happened to find it lying on my desk? On the same 
page (p. 7) the opinion states that our decisions reflect 
the rule that a "police officer [who] perceives a suspicious 
object", may "seize it immediately". You cite several 
cases, only two of which (Harris and Frazier) tend to sup-
port your position. Maron and Lefkowitz can be read to the 
contrary. 
In sum, while we normally try to work out language 
in an opinion where there is considerable agreement, I have 
no right to expect you to make the substantial changes in 
language that would relieve my concerns. Accordingly, I am 
circulating a concurring opinion based on the plain view 
rule that says substantially all that I think is necessary 





To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: Texas v. Brown, No. 81-419 
You asked me to look at the five cases WHR cites on the 
bottom of page 7 of his opinion in this case. None of the cases 
support a rule allowing seizure of any "suspicious" object, but 
Harris and Frazier are at least relevant to this case. (Harris, 
in particular, may be worth adding to the next draft of our opin-
ion.} In brief, the five cases hold as follows: 
, Marron v. United States, 27 5 u.S. 19 2 ( 19 27} : Prohibi-
~~nts had a warrant to search for liquor. While executing 
~r~- this warrant, they a s~d the ~ender and seized ledgers 
_, tY'f'· relating to 1' HELD: Agents could not seize 
~~ledge as incident to search for liquor, but could seize them as 
~1ncident to bartender's arrest. 
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 u.s. 344, 
358 (1931}: Prohibition agents, acting under color of an invalid 
arrest warrant, arrested two company officers and conducted gen-
eral search of premises. HELD: Search violated Fourth Amendment. 
At 358, Marron was distinguished. 
285 u.s. 452, 465 (1932}: 
defendants in room used to solicit 
liquor orders. Upon making the arrest, agents searched the room 
for evidence. HELD: Search violated Fourth Amendment. Dicta at 
465-466 draw a distinction between searches "merely to get evi-
dence" and searches "to find stolen goods for return to the own-
er," to take forfeited property, and to seize the instrumental-
page 2. 
i ties of crime 11 in order to prevent the commission of crime. 11 
(The Court does not put it in such terms, but the exclusionary 
rule would only affect the former category of searches.} 
curiam}: 
the car 
Barris v. United States, 390 u.s. 234, 236 (1968} (~ 
Police arrested a robbery suspect and validly seized 
he was driving. After completing a valid inventory 
search of the car, an officer went to close the windows to pro-
tect the car from rain. He then inadvertently saw a registration 
card belonging to the robbery victim that had been caught in the 
door jamb. HELD: Card was admissible. It was discovered in the 
plain view of an officer who had the right to be where he was. 
(The Court does not discuss probable cause in this brief ~ 
curiam, but it is clear that there was at least probable cause. 
The victim's name was prominent on the card.} 
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 u.s. 731 (1969}: Petr and his cous-
in both used a duffel bag. While it was at the cousin's house, 
he consented to a search of it. During this search, officer's 
discovered some of petr' s clothing, which was admitted as evi-
dence at trial. HELD: The cousin's consent justified the search. 
Since the search was lawful, the officers could seize evidence 
against the petr. (This was a minor point in the case. JUSTICE 
MARSHALL does not discuss probable cause.} 
In sum, Marron and Lefkowitz are contrary to JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST's position. Go-Bart strikes me as irrelevant. If any-
thing, it is contrary to JUSTICE REHNQUIST's position. Harris 
and .Frazier tend to support JUSTICE REHNQUIST's position, but 
neither goes so far. 
WH~ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-419 
TEXAS, PETITIONER v. CLIFFORD JAMES BROWN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS OF TEXAS 
[March -, 1983] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent Clifford James Brown was convicted in the 
District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, for possession of 
heroin in violation of state law. The Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that evidence intro-
duced at his trial should have been suppressed because it was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 1 That court rejected the state's con-
1 Brown argues that the decision below rested on an independent and ad-
equate state ground, and therefore that this Court lacks jurisdiction. Fox 
Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935). The position is untena-
ble. The opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rests squarely on 
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), and on 
Texas cases interpreting that decision, e. g., Howard v. State, 599 S. W. 2d 
597 (Tex. Cr. App. 1979); DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289 (Tex. Cr. App. 
1977); Duncan v. State, 549 S. W. 2d 730 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977); and Nicho-
las v. State, 502 S. W. 2d 169 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973). The only mention of 
the Texas Constitution occurs in a summary of Brown's contentions at the 
outset of the lower court's opinion. In a field like the Fourth Amendment, 
where the federal courts have been so active in imposing standards on state 
and local activities, a more affinnative indication in the opinion of the state 
court of reliance on state law is necessary before we will reject the likely 
explanation that "the [state] court felt compelled by what it understood to 
be federal constitutional considerations" to reach the result it did. Z ac-
chini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 568 (1977). 
Brown relies principally on Howard v. State, supra, and Duncan v. 
~··.{~ 
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tention that the so-called "plain view'' doctrine justified the 
police seizure. Because of apparent uncertainty concerning 
the scope and applicability of this doctrine, we granted cer-
tiorari, -- U. S. --, and now reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Criminal Appeals. 
On a summer evening in June, 1979, Harold Maples, an of-
ficer of the Fort Worth police force, assisted in setting up a 
routine driver's license checkpoint on East Allen Street in 
that city. Shortly before midnight Maples stopped an auto-
mobile driven by respondent Brown, who was alone. Stand-
ing alongside the driver's window of Brown's car, Maples 
asked him for his driver's license. At roughly the same 
time, Maples shined his flashlight into the car and saw Brown 
withdraw his right hand from his right pants pocket. 
Caught between the two middle fingers of the hand was an 
opaque, green party balloon, knotted about one half inch 
from the tip. Brown let the balloon fall to the seat beside his 
leg, and then reached across the passenger seat and opened 
the glove compartment. 
Because of his previous experience in arrests for drug of- · 
fenses, Maples testified that he was aware that narcotics fre-
State, supra. Neither decision supports the proposition that the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals based its decision upon state law. In Howard, 
the State argued that the plain view doctrine justified the seizure of a 
closed translucent medicine jar from an automobile. The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals rejected the claim, relying on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
supra, and stating that the State's arguments "cannot be squared with the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the plain view doctrine." 599 S. W. 2d, 
at 602. The court also relied on Thomas v. State, supra, which it charac-
terized as "[f]ollowing the teachings of Coolidge v. New Hampshire." 
Ibid. An additional opinion of the court on the State's Motion for Rehear-
ing merely elaborated upon the application of the plain view doctrine set 
forth in the court's original opinion. Similarly, in Duncan, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals rejected the State's reliance on the plain view theory, cit-
ing to Coolidge for a statement of the applicable law, as well as to Nicholas 
v. State, 502 S. W. 2d 169 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973). Like the court's other 
decisions in the area, Nicholas relied only on Coolidge. 
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quently were packaged in balloons like the one in Brown's 
hand. When he saw the balloon, Maples shifted his position 
in order to obtain a better view of the interior of the glove 
compartment. He noticed that it contained several small 
plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder, and an open 
bag of party balloons. After rummaging briefly through the 
glove compartment, Brown told Maples that he had no driv-
er's license in his possession. Maples then instructed him to 
get out of the car and stand at its rear. Brown complied, 
and, before following him to the rear of the car, Maples 
reached into the car and picked up the green balloon; there 
seemed to be a sort of powdery substance within the tied-off 
portion of the balloon. 
Maples then displayed the balloon to a fellow officer who 
indicated that he "understood the situation." The two offi-
cers then advised Brown that he was under arrest. 2 They 
also conducted an on-the-scene inventory of Brown's car, 
discovering several plastic bags containing a green leafy sub-
2 It is not clear on the record before us when Brown was arrested. The 
Court of Criminal Appeals stated, at one point in its opinion, that it did not 
question "the propriety of the arrest since appellant failed to produce a 
driver's license." This statement might be read to suggest that Brown 
was arrested upon his failure to produce a license, instead of at some point 
following seizure of the balloon from the car. The transcript of the sup-
pression hearing, however, indicates rather clearly that Brown was not 
formally arrested until after seizure of the balloon. J. App. 28-31. In the 
face of such indications, we decline to interpret the above-quoted clause 
from the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion as evidencing a belief that an 
arrest occurred prior to seizure of the balloon. Rather, we think it likely 
that the court was simply reasoning that Brown's arrest, whenever it may 
have taken place, was justified because of his failure to produce a driver's 
license. 
We do not address the argument that seizure of the balloon would have 
been justified under New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1982), which per-
mits warrantless searches of the passenger compartment of an automobile 
incident to an arrest, because of the absence of clear factual findings re-
garding the time at which, and the reason for which, Brown was arrested (/-?11 (,~ 
and because the lower court was not able to consider that decision. 
I 
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stance and a large bottle of milk sugar. These items, like the 
balloon, were seized by the officers. At the suppression 
hearing conducted by the District Court, a police department 
chemist testified that he had examined the substance in the 
balloon seized by Maples and determined that it was heroin. 
He also testified that narcotics frequently were packaged in 
ordinary party balloons. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals, discussing the Fourth 
Amendment issue, observed that "plain view alone is never 
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Pet. 
A-10, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 
468 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, Douglas, BRENNAN and MAR-
SHALL, JJ.) It further concluded that "Officer Maples had to 
know that 'incriminatory evidence was before him when he 
seized the balloon.'" Pet. A-ll (emphasis supplied), quoting 
DeLao v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 289, 291 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977). 
On the state's petition for rehearing, three judges dissented, 
stating their view that "[t]he issue turns on whether an offi-
cer, relying on years of practical experience and knowledge 
commonly accepted, has probable cause to seize the balloon in 
plain view." Pet. A-15, 16. 
Because the "plain view" doctrine generally is invoked in 
conjunction with other Fourth Amendment principles, such 
as those relating to warrants, probable cause, and search in-
cident to arrest, we rehearse briefly these better understood 
principles of Fourth Amendment law. That amendment se-
cures the persons, houses, papers and effects of the people 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and requires the 
existence of probable cause before a warrant shall issue. 
Our cases hold that procedure by way of a warrant is pre-J 
ferred, although in a wide range of diverse situations we have 
ecognized flexible, common-sense exceptions to this require-
ent. See, e. g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967) 
ot pursuit); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51-52 
(1951) (exigent circumstances); United States v. Ross, --
U. S. -- (1982) (automobile search); Chimel v. California, 
/ 
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395 U. S. 752 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 
218 (1973); and New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1982) 
(search of person and surrounding area incident to arrest); 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973) 
(search at border or "functional equivalent"); Zap v. United 
States, 328 U. S. 624, 630 (1946) (consent). We have also 
held to be permissible intrusions less severe than full-scale 
searches or seizures without the necessity of a warrant. 
See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, supra, (stop and frisk); United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, (seizure for questioning); 
Delaware v. Prouse, supra, (roadblock). One frequently 
mentioned "exception to the warrant requirement," Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at 443, is the so-called 
"plain view" doctrine, relied upon by the state in this case. 
While conceding that the green balloon seized by Officer 
Maples was clearly visible to him, the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held that the state might not avail itself of the "plain 
view" doctrine. That court said: 
"For the plain view doctrine to apply, not only must 
the officer be legitimately in a position to view the ob-
ject, but it must be immediately apparent to the police 
that they have evidence before them. This 'immedi-
ately apparent' aspect is central to the plain view excep-
tion and is here relied upon by appellant. (Citation omit-
ted). In this case then, Officer Maples had to know that 
'incriminatory evidence was before him when he seized 
the balloon."' Petn. A-10, A-11. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals based its conclusion primarily 
on th~opinion of this Court in Coolidge v. New 
Hamps tre, supra. In the Coolidge~ view, the 
"plain view" doctrine permits the warr~izure by po-
lice of private possessions where three requirements are sat-
isfied. 3 First, the police officer must lawfully make an "ini-
8 The~ also remarked that ''plain view alone is never enough to 
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tial intrusion" or otherwise properly be in a position from 
which he can view a particular area. I d., at 465--468. Sec-
ond, the officer must discover incriminating evidence "inad-
vertently," which is to say, he may not "know in advance the 
location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it," relying 
on the plain view doctrine only as a pretext. ld., at 470. 
Finally, it must be "immediately apparent" to the police that 
the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contra-
band, or otherwise subject to seizure. ld., at 469-470. 
While the lower courts generally have applied the Coolidge 
~discussion of "plain view," it has never been ex-
~dopted by a majority of this Court. On the con-
trary, th~s formulation was sharply criticized at the 
time, see, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U. S., at 
506 (Black, J., dissenting); id., at 516-521 (WHITE, J., dis-
senting). While not a binding precedent, as the considered 
opinion of four Members of this Court it should obviously be 
the point of reference for further discussion of the issue. 
The Coolidge uralit observed, "It is important to keep 
in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence 
seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the mo-
ment of seizure," simply as "the normal concomitant of any 
search, legal or illegal." 403 U. S., at 465. The question 
whether property in plain view of the police may be seized 
therefore must turn on the legality of the intrusion that en-
ables them to perceive and ically seize the property in 
question. The Coolidg luralit while following this ap-
justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
supra, 403 U. S., at 468. The court below appeared to understand this 
phrase to impose an independent limitation upon the scope of the ain view 
doctrine articulated in Coolidge. The context in which th luralit used 
the phrase, however, indicates that it was merely a rephrasing of its con-
clusion, discussed below, that in order for the plain view doctrine to apply, 
a police officer must be engaged in a lawful intrusion or must otherwise 
legitimately occupy the position affording him a "plain view." 
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proach to "plain view," characterized it as an independent ex-
,ception to the warrant requirement. At least from an an-
alytical perspective, this description may be somewhat 
inaccurate. We recognized in Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S. 573, 58~87 (1980), the well-settled rule that "objects 
such as weapons or contraband found in a public place may be 
seized by the police without a warrant. The seizure of prop-
erty in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is pre-
sumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause 
to associate the property with criminal activity." A differ-
ent situation is presented, however, when the property in 
open view is "situated on private premises to which access is 
not otherwise available for the seizing officer." Id., at 587, 
quoting, G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 
338, 354 (1977). As these cases indicate, "plain view" pro-
vides grounds for seizure of an item when an officer's access 
to an object has some prior justification under the Fourth 
Amendment. 4 "Plain view" is perhaps better understood, 
• Thus, police may perceive an object while executing a search warrant, 
or they may come across an item while acting pursuant to some exception 
to the warrant clause, e. g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Alternatively, police may need no jus-
tification under the Fourth Amendment for their access to an item, such as 
when property is left in a public place, see Payton v. New York, supra, 445 
U.S., at 587. 
It is important to distinguish "plain view," as used in Coolidge to justify 
seizure of an object, from an officer's mere observation of an item left in 
plain view. Whereas the latter generally involves no Fourth Amendment 
search, see pp. , infra; Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 
(1967), the former generally does implicate the Amendment's limitations 
upon seizures of personal property. The information obtained as a result 
of observation of an object in plain sight may be the basis for probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. In turn, these levels of 
suspicion may, in some cases, see e. g., Terry v. Ohio, supra; United States 
v. Ross,-- U. S. -- (1982), justify police conduct affording them ac-
cess to a particular item. 
unJ..erc« ts 1h.e 
WMTeutt rt'~ltlf"fl+1(tli 
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therefore, not as an independent "exception" to the warrant 
clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior jus-
tification for an officer's "access to an object" may be. 
The principle is grounded on the recognition that when a 
police officer has observed an object in "plain view," the own-
er's r~jute!:_ests in the object are merely those of pos-
sessiOn. ana ownership, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
supra, 403 U. S., at 515 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Likewise, 
it reflects the fact that requiring police to obtain a warrant 
once they have obtained a first-hand perception of contra-
band, stolen property or incriminating evidence generally 
would be a "needless inconvenience," 403 U. S., at 468, that 
might involve danger to the police and public. Ibid. We 
have said previously that "the permissibility of a particular 
law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion 
on . . . Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests." Delaware v. Prouse, d 'P~ 11 1;\-t 
supra, 440 U. S., at 654. In light of the private and govern] fl\1$ wvltf ~ 1 
mental interests just outlined, our decisions have come to re- ~( el\hrt r ~roatJ, 
fleet the rule that if, while )l!.._wfully engaged in an acti~y in a -rt • > Ft~ r too 
particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, 
th~ze it immediately. See Marron v. UniteD 1heSt ca-~~s Jo 11.or 
States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. ~L<tpfbrt WH~ 
United States, 282 U. S. 344, 358 (1931); United States v. "(l.f'rd...xr 
Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 465 (1932); Harris v. United States, l 'ThL$' $~'pfJ'rt tcdfl¥. 
390 U. S. 234, 236 (1968); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 73!) ntl€ -as /-1 
£
(1969). This rule merely reflects an application of the l 
Fourth Amendment's central requirement of reasonableness ) ? 
to the law governing seizures of property. 
Applying these principles, we conclude that Officer Maples 
properly seized the green balloon from Brown's automobile. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it did not "ques-
tion ... the validity of the officer's initial stop of appellant's 
vehicle as a part of a license check," Pet. A-10, and we agree. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979). It is 
81-419-0PINION 
TEXAS v. BROWN - 9 
likewise beyond dispute that Maples' action in shining his 
flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown's car trenched 
upon no right secured to the latter by the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Court said in United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 
563 (1927), that "[The] use of a searchlight is comparable to 
the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited 
by the Constitution." Numerous other courts have agreed 
that the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area 
simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no 
Fourth Amendment protection. 6 
Likewise, the fact that Maples "changed [his] position" and 
"bent down at an angle so [he] could see what was inside" 
Brown's car, J. App., at 16, is irrelevant to Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. The general public could peer into the inte-
rior of Brown's automobile from any number of angles; there 
is no reason Maples should be precluded from observing as an 
officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private citi-
zen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy, Katz v. 
United States, supra, 389 U. S., at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 739-745 
(1979), shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile 
which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either in-
quisitive passersby or diligent police officers. In short, the 
~ E. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1352, 1356-1357, n. 2 (CA9 
1982); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F. 2d 421, 427 (CA2 1981); United 
States v. P'U{Jh, 566 F. 2d 626, 627, n. 2 (CA81977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 
1010 (1978); United States v. Coplen, 541 F. 2d 211 (CA9 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U. S. 1073 (1977); United States v. Lara, 517 F. 2d 209 (CA5 
1975); United States v. Johnson, 506 F. 2d 674 (CAS 1974), cert. denied, 
421 U. S. 917 (1975); United States v. Booker, 461 F. 2d 990, 992 (CA6 
1972); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F. 2d 649 (CA7 1971); People v. 
Waits, 580 P. 2d 391 (Colo. 1978); Redd v. State, 243 S. E. 2d 16 (Ga. 1978); 
State v. Chattley, 390 A. 2d 472 (Me. 1978); State v. Vohnoutka , 292 N. W. 
2d 756 (Minn. 1980); Dick v. State, 596 P. 2d 1265 (Okla. Cr. 1979); State v. 
Miller, 608 P. 2d 595 (Ore. 1980); Albo v. State, 379 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1980). 
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conduct that enabled Maples to observe the interior of 
Brown's car and of his open glove compartment was not a 
f;ltvLf search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
VJf"' 1 Thus there can be no dispute here as to the presence of the 
first~f . e three requirements held necessary by the Coo-
lidge pluralit to invoke the "plain view" doctrine. 6 But the 
Cou riminal Appeals, as we have noted, felt the state's 
case ran aground on the requirement that the incriminating 
nature of the items be "immediately apparent" to the police 
officer. To the Court of Appeals, this apparently meant that 
the officer must be possessed of near certainty as to the 
seizable nature of the items. Decisions by this Court since 
Coolidge indicate that the use of the phrase "immediately ap-
parent" was very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it 
can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty 
as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for 
an application of the "plain view" doctrine. 
In Colorado v. Bannister, supra, 449 U. S., at 3-4, we ap-
plied what was in substance the plain view doctrine to an offi-
cer's seizure of evidence from an automobile. I d., at n. 4. 
The officer noticed that the occupants of the automobile 
matched a description of persons suspected of a theft and that 
auto parts in the open glove compartment of the car similarly 
resembled ones reported stolen. The Court held that these 
facts supplied the officer with "probable cause," id., at 4, and 
therefore, that he could seize the incriminating items from 
the car without a warrant. Plainly, the Court did not view 
the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge as estab-
lishing any requirement that a police officer "know" that cer-
tain items are contraband or evidence of a crime. Indeed, 
Colorado v. Bannister, supra, was merely an application of 
the rule, set forth in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 
6 While seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion 
into Brown's automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining re- . ~ .uUA j 
quirements of the plain view doctrine were satisfied. United States v. I Jvrf' v~· ..... ~ 
Ross,- U. S. - (1982). 
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(1980), that "[t]he seizure of property in plain view involves 
no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, as-
suming that there is probable cause to associate the property 
with criminal activity." /d., at 587 (emphasis added). We 
think this statement of the rule from Payton, supra, requir-
ing probable cause for seizure in the ordinary case, 7 is con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and we reaffirm it here. 
As the Court frequently has remarked, probable cause is a 
flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that 
the facts available to the officer would "warrant a man of rea-
sonable caution in the belief," Carroll v. Uni ed States, 267 
U. S. 132, 162 (1925), that certain item may b contraband 
or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not 
demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more 
likely true than false. A "practical, nontechnical" probabil-
ity that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is re-
quired. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 
(1949). Moreover, our observation in United States v. Cor-
tez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981), regarding "particularized 
suspicion," is equally applicable to the probable cause 
requirement: 
"The process does not deal with hard certainties, but 
with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities 
was articulated as such, practical people formulated cer-
tain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; 
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same-and 
so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence 
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of 
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those 
versed in the field of law enforcement." 
With these considerations in mind it is plain that Officer 
Maples possessed probable cause to believe that the balloon 
7 We need not address whether, in some circumstances, a degree of sus-
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in Brown's hand contained an illicit substance. Maples testi-
fied that he was aware, both from his participation in previ-
ous narcotics arrests and from discussions with other officers, 
that balloons tied in the manner of the one possessed by 
Brown were frequently used to carry narcotics. This testi-
mony was corroborated by that of a police department chem-
ist who noted that it was "common" for balloons to be used in 
packaging narcotics. In addition, Maples was able to ob-
serve the contents of the glove compartment of Brown's car, 
which revealed further suggestions that Brown was engaged 
in activities that might involve possession of illicit sub-
stances. The fact that Maples could not see through the 
opaque fabric of the balloon is all but irrelevant: the distinc-
tive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes as to its con-
tents-particularly to the trained eye of the officer. 
In addition to its statement that for seizure of objects in 
plain view to be justified the basis upon which they might be 
seized had to be "immediately apparent," and the require-
ment that the initial intrusion be lawful, both of which re-
quirements we hold were satisfied here, the Coolidge plural-
ity also stated that the police must discover incriminating 
evidence "inadvertently," which is to say, they may not 
"know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and in-
tend to seize it," relying on the plain view doctrine only as a 
pretense. !d., at 470. Whatever may be the final dispo-
sition of the "inadvertence" element of "plain view," 8 it j · 
learly was no bar to the seizure here. The circumstances of , 
this meeting between Maples and Brown give no suggestion £WYl~ 
that the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcot-
ics violation might be uncovered in "plain view" in the course 
8 See State v. King, 191 N. W. 2d 650, 655 (Iowa 1971); United States v. 
Santana, 485 F. 2d 365, 369--370 (CA2 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 931 
(1974); United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F. 2d 1097, 1101, n. 3 (CA4 1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U. S. 895 (1974); North v. Superior Court, 502 P. 2d 1305, 
1308 (Calif. 1972). 
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of a check for driver's licenses. Here, although the officers 
no doubt had an expectation that some of the cars they halted 
on East Allen Street-which was part of a "medium" area of 
narcotics traffic, J. App., at 33--would contain narcotics or 
paraphernalia, there is no indication in the record that they 
had anything beyond this generalized expectation. Like-
wise, there is no indication that Maples had any reason to be-
lieve that any particular object would be in Brown's glove 
compartment or elsewhere in his automobile. The "inadver-
tence" requirement of "plain view," properly understood, 
was no bar to the seizure here. 
Maples lawfully viewed the green balloon in the interior of 
Brown's car, and had probable cause to believe that it was 
subject to seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The judg-
ment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is accordingly 
reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
,, . 
March 17, 1983 
TEX13 GINA-POW 
81-419 Texas v. Brown 
Justice Powell, concurring. 
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of 
the Court's opinion relating to the application of the 
plain view exception to the warrant clause to the facts of 
this case. I do not join the Court's opinion because it 
goes well beyond the application of the plain view 
except ion. As I read the opinion, it appears to accord 
less significance to the warrant clause of the .Fourth 
Amendment than I think is justified by the language and 
purpose of that Amendment. 1 Writing in dissent in U.S. v. 
1Mike: Draft a note that identifies some of the 
language in Rehnquist's opinion that seems to subordinate 
the warrant clause to the reasonableness requirement. 
2. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, at 70 (1950), Just .Frankfurter 
wrote eloquently: 
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from 
the text and context and historic content of the 
.Fourth Amendment. * * * * When [that] Amendment 
outlawed 'unreasonable searches' and then went 
on to define the very restricted authority that 
even a search warrant issued by a magistrate 
could give, the .Framers said with all the 
clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 
"unreasonable" unless a war rant authorizes it, 
barring only except ions justified by absolute 
necessity". 
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in 
warrant clause cases have not always been consistent. 
They have reflected disagreement among Justices as to the 
extent to which the Clause limits the reasonableness 
standard of the Amendment. In one of my earliest 
decisions, United States v. United States District Court, 
407 u.s. 297' 316 (1972)' I refer to Justice 
.Frankfurther's dissent in Rabinowitz in emphasizing the 
importance of the warrant clause. Although I would not 
3. 
say that except ions can be justified only by "absolute 
necessity" 2 I stated that they were "few in number and 
carefully delineated". United States District Court, 
supra, at 318. 't'his has continued to be my view, as 
expresed recently in Arkansas v. Saunders, u.s. 
at {19 ___ ). It is a view frequently repeated by this 
Court. {Mike: cite cases). 
This case involves an application of the plain 
view except ion, first addressed at some length by the 
plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443 {1971). The Court today states that this opinion "has 
never been expressly adopted by a majority of this Court. 
2 I have considered the automobile exception, for 
example, as one clearly justified because of the nature of 
the vehicle. See, e.g. {Mike, cite several cases 
including Saunders and Martinez-Fuertes.) 
4. 
Ante at Whatever my view may have been when 
Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date to 
imply criticism of its articulation of this exception. It 
has been accepted generally for over a decade. 3 Moreover, 
it seems unnecessary to cast doubt on Coolidge in this 
case. Its plurality formulation is dispositive of the 
question before us. 
Respondent does not dispute that Officer Maples' 
initial intrusion was lawful. Respondent also concedes 
that the discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent 
in that it was observed in the course of a lawful 
inspection of the front seat area of the automobile. If 
probable cause must be shown, as the Payton dicta 
3Mike: Add whatever authority from CA's you 
think supports this statement. 
I<\ 
5. 
suggests, I think it is clear that it existed here. 4 
Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an 
arrest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off 
balloons similar to the one at issue here. Other officers 
had told him of such cases. Even if it were not generally 
known that a balloon is a common container for carrying 
illegal narcotics, we have recognized that a law 
enforcement officer may rely on his training and 
experience to draw inferences and make deductions that 
might well elude an untrained person. United States v. 
Cortez, 449 u.s. 411, 418 (1981). We are not advised of 
any innocent item that is commonly carried in uninflated, 
4Although probable cause was present in this case, 
I note with approval that the Court recognizes - without 
deciding - that reasonable suspicion of illegal activity 
may be sufficient. See fns. 4 and 6. 
'! 
6. 
tied-off balloon such as the one officer Maples seized. 
Accordingly, I join the Court's judgment as 
consistent with princples established by our prior 
decisions. 
mfs 03/20/83 
second draft: 81-419, Texas v. Brown 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the 
Court's opinion relating to the application in this case of the 
plain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not join 
the Court's opinion because it goes well beyond the application 
of the plain view exception. As I read the opinion, it appears 
to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment than is justified by the language and purpose of that 
Amendment. In dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 u.s. 
56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote eloquently: 
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the 
text and context and historic content of the Fourth 
Amendment.... When [that] Amendment outlawed 
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the 
very restricted authority that even a search warrant 
issued by a magistrate could give, the framers said 
with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a 
search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes 
it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute ne-
cessity." Id., at 70. 
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause 
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected dis-
agreement among Justices as to the extent to which the Clause 
defines the reasonableness standard of the Amendment. In one of 
my earliest opinions, United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), I cited Justice Frankfurter's Rabino-
witz dissent in emphasizing the importance of the Warrant Clause. 
~ 
Id. , at 316 0 Although I 94e not 
" 
say that exceptions can be jus-
tified only by "absolute necessity, nl I stated that they were 
1 I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as 
one clearly justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, 




second draft: 81-419, Texas v. Brown page 2. 
"few in number and carefully delineated." Id., at 318. This has 
continued to be my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 u.s. 7S3, 7S9 (1979). It is a view frequently re-
peated by this Court. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 u.s. 
798, (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) 
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 u.s. 30, 34 (1970); 
Katz v. United States, 389 u.s. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Munic-
ipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-529 (1967); Jones v. United States, 
357 u.s. 493, 499 (1958). 
This case involves an application of the plain view excep-
tion, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion in 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443 (1971). The Court today 
states that this opinion "has never been expressly adopted by a 
majority of this Court." Ante, at 6. Whatever my view may have 
been when Coolidge was decided, I see no reason at this late date 
to imply criticism of its articulation of this exception. It has 
been accepted generally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems 
e • g • , Arkansas v . Sanders, 4 4 2 U. S . 7 53 , 7 6 0 -7 61 ( 19 7 9) ; United 
States v. Martinez-Puerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., 
concurring) • 
2see, e.g., United States v. Chesher, 678 P.2d 1353, 1356-
1357 (CA9 1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 P.2d 554, 558-560 
(CAl 1982); United States v. Tolerton, 669 P.2d 652, 6S3-655 
( CA 10) , c e r t. denied, U.S • ( 19 8 2) ; United States v • 
Antill, 615 P.2d 648, 6~(CA5) (per curiam), cert. den1ed, 449 
u.s. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 P.2d 1309, 1313-
1314 (CAS 1978); Un1ted States v. Williams, 523 P.2d 64, 66-67 
(CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 u.s. 1090 (1976); United States v. 
Truitt, 521 P.2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. 
Pacelli, 470 P.2d 67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 
983 (1973); United States v. Drew, 451 P.2d 230, 232-234 (CAS 
Footnote continued on next page. 
1 ::. 
second draft: 81-419, Texas v. Brown page 3. 
unnecessary to cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurali-
ty formulation is dispositive of the question before us. 
Respondent does not dispute that Officer Maples' initial 
intrusion was lawful. Respondent also concedes that the discov-
ery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was ob-
served in the course of a lawful inspection of the front seat 
area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as the 
Payton dicta suggests, 3 I think it is clear that it existed here. \ 
Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an arrest in 
a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons similar 
to the one at issue here. Other officers had told him of such 
cases. Even if it were not generally known that a balloon is a 
common container for carrying illegal narcotics, we have recog-
nized that a law enforcement officer may rely on his training and 
experience to draw inferences and make deductions that might well 
elude an untrained person. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 418 (1981). We are not advised of any innocent item that is 
commonly carried in uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the one 
6 fficer Maples seized. 
Accordingly, I join the Court's judgment as it is consistent 
with princples established by our prior decisions. 
1971). 
3see Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 573, 587 (1980). Although I 
probable cause was present in this case, I note with approval 
that the Court recognizes--without deciding--that reasonable sus-
picion of illegal activity may be sufficient to justify a seizure 
in some cases. See ante, at 7, n. 4, and 11, n. 7. 
't I ;,_'• 
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[March - , 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the 
Court's opinion relating to the application in this case of the 
plain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not 
join the Court's opinion because it goes well beyond the appli-
cation of the exception. As I read the opinion, it appears 
to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and 
purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote 
eloquently: 
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the 
text and context and historic content of the Fourth 
Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed 
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the 
very restricted authority that even a search warrant is-
sued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all 
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unrea-
sonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only 
exceptions justified by absolute necessity." Id., at 70. 
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause 
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected 
disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the 
Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amend-
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ment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited 
Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the 
importance of the Warrant Clause. I d., at 316. Although I 
would not say that exceptions can be justified only by "abso-
lute necessity," 1 I stated that they were "few in number and 
carefully delineated." !d., at 318. This has continued to be 
my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by 
this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 
-- (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978) 
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34 
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528-529 (1967); 
Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958). 
This case involves an application of the plain view excep-
tion, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion 
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The 
Court today states that this opinion "has never been ex-
pressly adopted by a majority of this Court." Ante, at 6. 
Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was de-
cided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its 
articulation of this exception. It has been accepted gener-
ally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to 
1 I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly 
justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). 
•see, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 1356-1357 (CA9 
1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 558-560 (CA11982); United 
States v. Tolerton, 669 F. 2d 652, 653-655 (CAlO), cert. denied,- U. S. 
- (1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F. 2d 
1309, 1313-1314 (CA5 1978); United States v. Williams, 523 F. 2d 64, 66-67 
(CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt, 
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cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurality formulation 
is dispositive of the question before us. 
Respondent does not dispute that Officer Maples' initial in-
trusion was lawful. Respondent also concedes that the dis-
covery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was 
observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front seat 
area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as 
the Payton dicta suggests,3 I think it is clear that it existed 
here. Officer Maples testified that he previously had made 
an arrest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off 
balloons similar to the one at issue here. Other officers had 
told him of such cases. Even if it were not generally known 
that a balloon is a common container for carrying illegal nar-
cotics, we have recognized that a law enforcement officer 
may rely on his training and experience to draw inferences 
and make deductions that might well elude an untrained per-
son. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). 
We are not advised of any innocent item that is commonly 
carried in uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the one Officer 
Maples seized. 
Accordingly, I concur in the Court's judgment as it is con-
sistent with principles established by our prior decisions. 
521 F. 2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F. 2d 
67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v. 
Drew, 451 F. 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971). 
3 See Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980). Although proba-
ble cause was present in this case, I note with approval that the Court rec-
ognizes-without deciding-that reasonable suspicion of illegal activity 
may be sufficient to justify a seizure in some cases. See ante, at 7, n. 4, 
and 11, n. 7. 
81-419 Texas v. Brown 
"' :near Bi 11: 
As \''e usually aq ree ., in the criminal law area, ! 
write to say why I have concluded that we are too far apart 
in this case to qet together. My view of the relative im-
portance of the warrant clause has differed from yours and 
' the Chief's, and apparently now from Byron's and San~ra's. 
Jn view of what I have written about it in the past, T can-
.. ~ot joi.n your oPinion. 
Also, I am troubled by the "cold water" that you 
toss on Potter's opinion in Coolidge. If we had come on the 
Court earlier, I am by no means sure I would have joined 
· Potter the way he wrote i.t. Rut at least the substance of 
the plain view exception seems established, and r have not 
been aware that it has created any genuine problem. The 
rule clearly fits this case , and I would have thought that 
no Purpose is served by not making a straightforward appli-












JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.;%ttprttttt Qfotttt of tltt ~ttiicb ~hUts 
'~ht!d(htghm. ~. cg. 20,?J!.~ 
Re: No. 81-419 - Texas v. Brown 
Dear Bill: 
March 24, 1983 
I have delayed my vote in this case because, like Lewis, 
I have been troubled about the breadth of your opinion. I 
share his feeling that the opinion "goes well beyond the 
application of the exception." Thus, as of now, I am join-
ing Lewis' opinion on the assumption that he will eliminate· 
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._:udtitt¢on. ~. ~· 21l~~~ 
JusTtcE HARRY A. sLAcKMUN March 24, 1983 
Re: No. 81-419, Texas v. Brown 
Dear Lewis: 
If, as we discussed by telephone this afternoon, 
you would eliminate footnote 3 on page 3 of your opinion 
concurring in the judgment, I would be glad to join your 
opinion. I suggest this only because I would prefer to 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-419 
TEXAS, PETITIONER v. CLIFFORD JAMES BROWN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS OF TEXAS 
[M,Itch -, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, 
concurring in the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the 
r "'iiiiiit}opinion relating to the application in this case of the 
lain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not 
join the opinion because it goes well beyond the appli-
cation of the exception. As I read the opinion, it appears 
to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and 
purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote 
eloquently: 
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the 
text and context and historic content of the Fourth 
Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed 
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the 
very restricted authority that even a search warrant is-
sued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all 
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unrea-
sonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only 
exceptions justified by absolute necessity." !d., at 70. 
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause 
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected 
disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the 
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Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amend-
ment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited 
Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the 
importance of the Warrant Clause. I d., at 316. Although I 
would not say that exceptions can be justified only by "abso-
lute necessity," 1 I stated that they were "few in number and 
carefully delineated." Id., at 318. This has continued to be 
my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by 
this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 
-:It" (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978) 
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34 
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 52~529 (1967); 
Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958). 
This case involves an application of the plain view excep-
tion, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion 
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The 
J--~ today states that this opinion "has never been ex-
adopted by a majority of this Court." Ante, at 6. 
Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was de-
cided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its 
articulation of this exception. It has been accepted gener-
ally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to 
'I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly 
justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). 
2 See, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 135&-1357 (CA9 
1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 558-560 (CA11982); United 
States v. Tolerton, 669 F. 2d 652, 653-655 (CAlO), cert. denied,- U. S. 
- (1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F. 2d 
1309, 1313-1314 (CA5 1978); United States v. Williams, 523 F. 2d 64, 6&-67 
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cast doubt on Coolidge in t · ase. Its plurality formulation 
is dis ositive of the question b ore us. 
Responden does not dispute t at Officer Maples' initial in-
trusion was lawful. 2 z d$ t also concedes that the dis-
covery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was 
observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front seat 
area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as 
t e ay on 1c a sugges , see Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S. 573, 587 (1980), I think it is clear that it existed here. 
Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an ar-
rest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons 
similar to the one at issue here. Other officers had told him 
of such cases. Even if it were not generally known that a 
balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics, 
we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely 
on his training and experience to draw inferences and make 
deductions that might well elude an untrained person. 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). We are 
not advised of any innocent item that is commonly carried in 
uninflated, tied-off balloon such as the one Officer Maples 
seized. 
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment as it is con-
sistent with principles established by our prior decisions. 
(CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt, 
521 F. 2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F. 2d 
67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v. 
Drew, 451 F. 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971). 
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SlWREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-419 
TEXAS, PETITIONER v. CLIFFORD JAMES BROWN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS OF TEXAS 
[March -, 1983] 
JusTICE PowELL, with whom JusTICE BLACKMUN joins, I 
concurring in the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the 
Court's opinion relating to the application in this case of the 
plain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do not 
join the Court's opinion because it goes well beyond the appli-
cation of the exception. As I read the opinion, it appears 
to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and 
purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote 
eloquently: 
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the 
text and context and historic content of the Fourth 
Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed 
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the 
very restricted authority that even a search warrant is-
sued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all 
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unrea-
sonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only 
exceptions justified by absolute necessity." I d., at 70. 
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause 
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected 
disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the 
81-419-CONCUR 
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Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amend-
ment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited 
Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the 
importance of the Warrant Clause. I d., at 316. Although I 
would not say that exceptions can be justified only by "abso-
lute necessity," 1 I stated that they were "few in number and 
carefully delineated." Id., at 318. This has continued to be 
my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by 
this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 
-- (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978) 
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34 
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 52~529 (1967); 
Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958). 
This case involves an application of the plain view excep-
tion, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion 
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The 
Court today states that this opinion "has never been ex-
pressly adopted by a majority of this Court." Ante, at 6. 
Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was de-
cided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its 
articulation of this exception. It has been accepted gener-
ally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to 
'I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly 
justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). 
•see, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 135&-1357 (CA9 
1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 55~560 (CA11982); United 
States v. Tolerton, 669 F. 2d 652, 653-655 (CAlO), cert. denied,- U. S. 
- (1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F. 2d 
1309, 1313-1314 (CA51978); United States v. Williams, 523 F. 2d 64, 6&-67 
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cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurality formulation 
is dispositive of the question before us. 
Respondent does not dispute that Officer Maples' initial in-
trusion was lawful. Respondent also concedes that the dis-
covery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it was 
observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front seat 
area of the automobile. If probable cause must be shown, as 
the Payton dicta suggests, see Payton v. New York, 445 \ 
U. S. 573, 587 (1980), I think it is clear that it existed here. 
Officer Maples testified that he previously had made an ar-
rest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-off balloons 
similar to the one at issue here. Other officers had told him 
of such cases. Even if it were not generally known that a 
balloon is a common container for carrying illegal narcotics, 
we have recognized that a law enforcement officer may rely 
on his training and experience to draw inferences and make 
deductions that might well elude an untrained person. 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). We are 
not advised of any innocent item that is commonly carried in 
uninfiated, tied-off balloon such as the one Officer Maples 
seized. 
Accordingly, I concur in the Court's judgment as it is con-
sistent with principles established by our prior decisions. 
(CAB 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt, 
521 F. 2d 1174, 117fr..1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli, 470 F. 2d 
67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v. 
Drew, 451 F. 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971). Ol'ti,if't'\ 
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April 6, 1983 
Re: No. 81-419 -- Texas v. Brown 
Dear John, 








il'· Dear ,John: 
II.'· ,• 
I note in your opinion that you address the 
"search" of the balloon, in addition to its seizure. 
t.'": I) My impression i's ' that the· search question is not 
before us, as was conceded. at oral argument. 
I called this morning to raise this point. I un-
derstand vou are out of the city, but suspect that you are . 
not in Chicago for the vote on Tuesday • • What an unsavo-ry 
si taut ion 1 .. ,. 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~uvuuu C4!turlltf t!r.t ~nit.tb ~hd.tlT 
.. ufringhtn. ~. (!J. 2.0bf'!c1 
April 11, 1983 
Re: 81-419 - Texas v. Brown 
Dear Lewis: 
Thanks for your note. I recognize that the 
search point was not argued and may not have been 
preserved. That, of course, is the reason for my 
footnote 1 (which I am expanding) on page 3. 
I saw both Chris Whitman and Dallin Oaks at a 
moot court in Ann Arbor, and both made a special 





JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.;%u.pum.e {!fo1td of tlft ~b ,;§t&Us 
'masJrhtghttt, lB. <!J. 2ll.;iJ!.;l 
April 12, 1983 
Re: No. 81-419 - Texas v. Brown 
Dear John: 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-419 
TEXAS, PETITIONER v. CLIFFORD JAMES BROWN 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS OF TEXAS 
[April -, 1983] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, 
concurring in the judgment. / 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the war-
rantless seizure of respondent's balloon could not be justified 
under the plain view doctrine because incriminating evidence 
was not immediately apparent. This Court reverses, hold-
ing that even though the contents of the balloon were not vis-
ible to the officer, incriminating evidence was immediately 
apparent because he had probable cause to believe the bal-
loon contained an illicit substance. I agree with the Court 
that contraband need not be visible in order for a plain view 
seizure to be justified. I therefore concur in the conclusion 
that the Texas Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment 
more strictly than is required. 
The plurality's explanation of our disposition of this case is, J 
however, incomplete. It gives adequate consideration to our 
cases holding that a closed container may not be opened with-
out a warrant, even when the container is in plain view -and 
the officer has probable cause to believe contraband is con-
cealed within. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 
(1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979); United 
States v. Ross, -- U. S. --, -- (1982). Final deter-
mination of whether the trial court properly denied the sup-
pression motion requires a more complete understanding of 
the plain view doctrine, as well as the answer to a factual in-
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quiry that remains open to the state court on remand. 
Although our Fourth Amendment cases sometimes refer 
indiscriminately to searches and seizures, there are impor-
tant differences between the two that are relevant to the 
plain view doctrine. The Amendment protects two different 
interests of the citizen-the interest in retaining possession 
of property and the interest in maintaining personal privacy. 
A seizure threatens the former, a search the latter. As a 
matter of timing, a seizure is usually preceded by a search, 
but when a container is involved the converse is often true. 
Significantly, the two protected interests are not always 
present to the same extent; for example, the seizure of a 
locked suitcase does not necessarily compromise the secrecy 
of its contents, and the search of a stopped vehicle does not 
necessarily deprive its owner of possession. 
An object may be considered to be "in plain view" if it can 
be seized without compromising any interest in privacy. 
Since seizure of such an object threatens only the interest in 
possession, circumstances diminishing that interest may jus-
tify exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's usual -require-
ments. Thus, if an item has been abandoned, neither Fourth 
Amendment interest is implicated, and neither probable 
cause nor a warrant is necessary to justify seizure. See 
e. g., Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 241 (1960); cf. 
United States v. Lisk, 522 F. 2d 228, 230 (7th Cir. 1975). 
And if an officer has probable cause to believe that a publicly 
situated item is associated with criminal activity, the interest 
in possession is outweighed by the risk that such an item 
might disappear or be put to its intended use before a war-
rant could be obtained. The officer may therefore seize it 
without a warrant. See G.M. ·Leasing Corp. v. United 
States, 429 U. S. 338, 354 (1975); Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S. 573, 587 (1980). The "plain view" exception to the 
warrant requirement is easy to understand and to apply in 
cases in which no search is made and no intrusion on privacy 
occurs. 
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The Court's more difficult plain view cases, however, have 
regularly arisen in two contexts that link the seizure with a 
prior or subsequent search. The first is the situation in 
which an officer who is executing a valid search for one item 
seizes a different item. The Court has been sensitive to the 
danger inherent in such a situation that officers will enlarge a 
specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency, 
into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and 
seize at will. That danger is averted by strict attention to 
two of the core requirements of plain view: seizing the item 
must entail no significant additional invasion of privacy, and 
at the time of seizure the officer must have probable cause to 
connect the item with criminal behavior. See United States 
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 465 (1932); cf. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 465-466 (1971). 
The second familiar context is the situation in which an offi-
cer comes upon a container in plain view and wants both to 
seize it and to examine its contents. In recent years, the 
Court has spoken at some length about the latter act, e. g., 
Ross, supra; Chadwick, supra;. Sanders, supra, emphasizing 
the Fourth Amendment privacy values implicated whenever 
a container is opened. In this case, however, both the 
search of a container (the balloon) and the antecedent seizure 
are open to challenge. 1 In that regard, it more closely re-
sembles Coolidge, supra. 2 All of these cases, however, 
'In defending the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment before 
this Court, the respondent did not rely upon a challenge to the search of 
the balloon. I nevertheless believe it is necessary to elaborate upon the 
distinction between the balloon's search and its seizure in this case in order 
to clarify what the Court does and does not hold today. Moreover, it is not 
clear to me whether, as a matter of Texas law, the respondent would still 
be permitted to present an argument that the evidence should be sup-
pressed because it was obtained after a search of the balloon. See infra, 
n. 3. 
2 Although Coolidge is not always thought of as a container case, the 
Court was required to confront New Hampshire's separate attempts to jus-
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demonstrate that the constitutionality of a container search is 
not automatically determined by the constitutionality of the 
prior seizure. See Chadwick, supra, at 13--14, n. 8; Sand-
ers, supra, at 761-762. Separate inquiries are necessary, 
taking into account the separate interests at stake. 
If a movable container is in plain view, seizure does not im-
plicate any privacy interests. Therefore, if there is probable 
cause to believe it contains contraband, the owner's posses-
sory interest in the container must yield to society's interest 
in making sure that the contraband does not vanish during 
the time it would take to obtain a warrant. The item may be 
seized temporarily. It does not follow, however, that the 
container may be opened on the spot. Once the container is 
in custody, there is no risk that evidence will be destroyed. 
Some inconvenience to the officer is entailed by requiring him 
to obtain a warrant before opening the container, but that 
alone does not excuse the duty to go before a neutral magis-
trate. Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 15 (1948); 
'McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 455 (1948). As 
JusTICE PowELL emphasizes, ante, at 1-2, the Warrant 
Clause embodies our government's historical commitment to 
bear the burden of inconvenience. Exigent circumstances 
must be shown before the Constitution will entrust an indi-
vidual's privacy to the judgment of a single police officer. 
In this case, I have no doubt concerning the propriety of 
the officer's warrantless seizure of the balloon. For the rea-
sons stated by JUSTICES POWELL and REHNQUIST, I agree 
that the police officer invaded no privacy interest in order to 
see the balloon, and that when he saw it he had probable 
cause to believe it contained drugs. But before the balloon's 
tify both its warrantless seizure of a container, an immobilized automobile, 
see id., at 464-473, and its subsequent warrantless searches of the contain-
er's interior, see id., at 458-464. 
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contents could be used as evidence against the respondent, 
the state also had to justify opening it without a warrant. 3 I 
can perceive two potential justifications. First, it is entirely 
possible that what the officer saw in the car's glove compart-
ment, coupled with his observation of respondent and the 
contents of his pockets, provided probable cause to believe 
that contraband was located somewhere in the car-and not 
merely in the one balloon at issue. If so, then under Ross, 
supra, which was not decided until after the Texas Court of 
Civil Appeals reviewed this case, it was permissible to exam-
ine the contents of any container in the car, including this 
balloon. 
Alternatively, the balloon could be one of those rare single-
purpose containers which "by their very nature cannot sup-
port any reasonable expectation of privacy because their con-
tents can be inferred from their outward appearance." 
Sanders, supra, at 764-765, n. 13. Whereas a suitcase or a 
paper bag may contain an almost infinite variety of items, a 
balloon of this kind might be used only to transport drugs. 
Viewing it where he did could have given the officer a degree 
of certainty that is equivalent to the plain view of the heroin 
itself. If that be true, I would conclude that the plain view 
doctrine supports the search as well as the seizure even 
though the contents of the balloon were not actually visible to 
the officer. 4 
This reasoning leads me to the conclusion that the Fourth 
3 Arguably, as a matter of Texas law the respondent has waived his I 
right to demand such a justification. That is, of course, an issue for the 
Texas courts. . 
• Conversely, the fact that an object is visible does not automatically 
mean that it is in plain view in the sense that no invasion of privacy is re-
quired to seize it. This case does not require elaboration of what the 
Fourth Amendment demands before an officer may seize a visible item that 
he could not reach without, for example, entering a private home or de-
stroying a valuable container. See Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1, 5 
(1932). 
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Amendment would not require exclusion of the balloon's con-
tents in this case if, but only if, there was probable cause to 
search the entire vehicle or there was virtual certainty that 
the balloon contained a controlled substance. 5 Neither of 
these fact-bound inquiries was made by the Texas courts, and 
neither should be made by this Court in the first instance. 
Moreover, it may be that on remand the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals will find those inquiries unnecessary be-
cause the respondent may have waived his right to demand 
them. See supra, n. 3. I therefore concur in the judgment. 
5 Sometimes there can be greater certainty about the identity of a sub-
stance within a container than about the identity of a substance that is ac-
tually visible. One might actually see a white powder without realizing 
that it is heroin, but be virtually certain a balloon contains such a substance 
in a particular context. It seems to me that in evaluating whether a per-
son's privacy interests are infringed, "virtual certainty'' is a more meaning-
ful indicator than visibility. 
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No. 81-419 
TEXAS, PETITIONER v. CLIFFORD JAMES BROWN 
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APPEALS OF TEXAS 
[April -, 1983] , 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, 
concurring in the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment, and also agree with much of the 
plurality's opinion relating to the application in this case of \ 
the plain view exception to the Warrant Clause. But I do 
not join the plurality's opinion because it goes well beyond 
the application of the exception. As I read the opinion, it 
appears 
to accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment than is justified by the language and 
purpose of that Amendment. In dissent in United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter wrote 
eloquently: 
"One cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the 
text and context and historic content of the Fourth 
Amendment. . . . When [that] Amendment outlawed 
'unreasonable searches' and then went on to define the 
very restricted authority that even a search warrant is-
sued by a magistrate could give, the framers said with all 
the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unrea-
sonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only 
exceptions justified by absolute necessity." I d., at 70. 
To be sure, the opinions of this Court in Warrant Clause 
cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected 
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disagreement among Justices as to the extent to which the 
Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amend-
ment. In one of my earliest opinions, United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972), I cited 
Justice Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent in emphasizing the 
importance of the Warrant Clause. I d., at 316. Although I 
would not say that exceptions can be justified only by "abso-
lute necessity," 1 I stated that they were "few in number and 
carefully delineated." Id., at 318. This has continued to be 
my view, as expressed recently in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 
U. S. 753, 759 (1979). It is a view frequently repeated by 
this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 
825 (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 (1978) l 
(unanimous decision); Vale v. Lousiana, 399 U. S. 30, 34 
(1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967); 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 52~529 (1967); 
Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499 (1958). 
This case involves an application of the plain view excep-
tion, first addressed at some length by the plurality opinion 
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). The 
plurality today states that this opinion "has never been ex- \ 
pressly adopted by a majority of this Court." Ante, at 6. 
Whatever my view might have been when Coolidge was de-
cided, I see no reason at this late date to imply criticism of its 
articulation of this exception. It has been accepted gener-
ally for over a decade. 2 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to 
1 I have considered the automobile exception, for example, as one clearly 
justified because of the nature of the vehicle. See, e. g., Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, 760-761 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U. S. 543, 561-562 (1976); Almeida·-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). 
2 See, e. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F. 2d 1353, 1356-1357 (CA9 
1982); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F. 2d 554, 55&-560 (CA11982); United 
States v. Tolerton, 669 F . 2d 652, 653-655 (CAlO), cert. denied,- U.S. 
- (1982); United States v. Antill, 615 F. 2d 648, 649 (CA5) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 449 U. S. 866 (1980); United States v. Duckett, 583 F . 2d 
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cast doubt on Coolidge in this case. Its plurality formulation 
is dispositive of the question before us. 
Respondent Brown does not dispute that Officer Maples' j 
initial intrusion was lawful. Brown also concedes that the 
discovery of the tied-off balloon was inadvertent in that it 
was observed in the course of a lawful inspection of the front 
seat area of the automobile. If probable cause must be 
shown, as the Payton dicta suggest, see Payton v. New / 
York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), I think it is clear that it ex-
isted here. Officer Maples testified that he previously had 
made an arrest in a case where narcotics were carried in tied-
off balloons similar to the one at issue here. Other officers 
had told him of such cases. Even if it were not generally 
known that a balloon is a common container for carrying ille-
gal narcotics, we have recognized that a law enforcement offi-
cer may rely on his training and experience to draw infer-
ences and make deductions that might well elude an 
untrained person. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 
418 (1981). We are not advised of any innocent item that is 
commonly carried in uninfiated, tied-off balloon such as the 
one Officer Maples seized. 
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment as it is consistent / 
with principles established by our prior decisions. 
1309, 1313-1314 (CA5 1978); United States v. Williams , 523 F. 2d 64, 61H37 
(CA8 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1090 (1976); United States v. Truitt , 
521 F. 2d 1174, 1175-1178 (CA6 1975); United States v. Pacelli , 470 F. 2d 
67, 70-72 (CA2 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 983 (1973); United States v. 
Drew, 451 F . 2d 230, 232-234 (CA5 1971). 
-.: ~ ..... --- ~ < l.l .... t" -- :--.,.., :t 'W ~ 
I I 







-;_ 1.J.t ~ r · ~ -- . ~ t' t:C ~ C' ? ""' --- .J:. ~ w ~ ~ 
~ 















Ul ' ~t 0 "' w 'l·f £ <: ~l?-. r 
tt1 




~ 5t v ~ r ~ ~l 1..::::.... ............ - '?-- rl ~ v- :St: ~t ~ ~~ ~ ~~t ?= l.J "'I ~ 0() v ~ ? w 
~ ~ -1:: w ~ ~ ~ t ~r-~ ~~ ~ l h t.t. t wt ~t :--~ ............ ~ ~ ~ L :-o 00 w u ~ ~ ~ .... 
i1 > y. ......._ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~ l ~::>(") ~ !=' w ~ 0 p 
-
